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LET ME BE QUEER:   
THE NEED FOR LGBT PROTECTIONS IN 
INDIANA 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
In 2015, Indiana Governor Mike Pence signed the state’s Religious 
Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA) into effect.1  This bill allows individuals 
and companies to claim their religious beliefs as a defense in legal 
proceedings by stating that their religious beliefs have been, or are likely 
to be, burdened by providing some service or good.2  As a result, the 
LGBT+ (LGBT) community interpreted the passing of this bill as a direct 
attack on their rights and freedom.3  Their fears were confirmed when a 
pizza restaurant in Walkerton, Indiana announced a week after the 
passage of the bill that they would refuse to cater any wedding for a same-
sex couple.4 
In July 2014, just days after the federal court struck down Indiana's 
law prohibiting gay marriages, Mark G. Ahearn, chief counsel to 
Governor Mike Pence, issued a memo to all executive branches outlining 
Indiana’s position.5  The memo stated that Indiana's law against same-sex 
marriages "is in full force and effect and executive branch agencies are to 
execute their functions as though the U.S. District Court order of June 25 
had not been issued."6  In Indiana, this decision struck down Indiana’s law 
forbidding gay marriages, resulting in several hundred same-sex 
marriages.7  While it seemed like a great victory, it took just two days for 
                                                
1 See IND. CODE § 34-13-9 (describing Indiana’s infamous Religious Freedom Restoration 
Act).  See also IND. CODE § 34-13-9-0.7 (observing the “fix” that Indiana added to the Religious 
Freedom Restoration Act, which was meant to prevent discrimination based on sexual 
orientation). 
2 See IND. CODE § 34-13-9 (conveying Indiana’s RFRA discriminatory purpose and effect 
on LGBT citizens). 
3 See Kristine Guerra, How Indiana's RFRA differs from federal version, INDIANAPOLIS STAR 
(Mar. 31, 2015), https://www.indystar.com/story/news/politics/2015/03/31/indianas-
rfra-similar-federal-rfra/70729888/ [https://perma.cc/WD2A-VS7B] (observing the outcry 
by LGBT citizens of Indiana who were concerned for their rights). 
4 See id. (describing the state and national story of a pizza shop owner who refused to 
cater a same-sex couple’s wedding, justifying his refusal using RFRA). 
5 See Barb Berggoetz, Indiana Won't Recognize Last Month's Same-Sex Marriages, 
INDIANAPOLIS STAR (July 9, 2014), https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/2014/ 
07/09/gay-marriage-indiana/12412667/ [https://perma.cc/2ATL-ZDCK] (pointing out the 
chief counsel’s position in opposition to same-sex marriage). 
6 Id. 
7 See id. 
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the Court of Appeals to stay the ruling.8  This memo simply confirmed the 
governor of Indiana’s refusal to recognize the legality of the several 
hundred same-sex marriages that occurred over those few days.9 
In March 2016, Indiana attempted to pass a bill that would prevent 
cities and other local government entities from passing nondiscrimination 
protections that are greater than the protections offered at the state level.10  
The bill failed, but the rights provided by these cities and counties would 
have been eliminated if the bill had passed.11  The North Carolina 
legislature argued a similar bill in March 2016, however the bill passed 
and was put into law in that state.12 
Fortunately, the marriage equality issue changed with the 
monumental Supreme Court decision in Obergefell and the discriminatory 
bill eliminating local protections failed.13  In addition, RFRA was amended 
to provide limited protections for the LGBT community.14  However, an 
underlying problem remains:  Indiana lacks comprehensive protections 
for the LGBT community.15 
The simplest and most effective way for Indiana to protect its LGBT 
citizens from discrimination would be by simply amending its Civil 
Rights Act.16  This Note proposes that Indiana amend its Civil Rights Act 
and add “sexual orientation” and “gender identity” to the list of protected 
groups because current LGBT citizens lack comprehensive, state-wide 
protections, which leaves these citizens susceptible to discrimination.17  
Next, Part II describes the various federal, state, and local protections for 
                                                
8 See Baskin v. Bogan, 766 F.3d 648, 672 (7th Cir. 2014) (staying the district court’s decision 
to allow same-sex marriages in Indiana).  See also Berggoetz, supra note 5 (reviewing the 
Court of Appeal’s decision to stay the ruling). 
9 See Berggoetz, supra note 5. 
10 See S.B. 100, 119th Gen. Assemb., 2d Reg. Sess. (Ind. 2016) (describing the bill in Indiana 
that failed in the Senate but that would have eliminated local city and county protections for 
the LGBT community). 
11 Id. 
12 Compare S.B. 100, 119th Gen. Assemb., 2d Reg. Sess. (Ind. 2016) (portraying Indiana’s 
failure to pass the Senate Bill eliminating local city and county protections for the LGBT 
community), with Public Facilities Privacy & Security Act, H.B. 2, 2016 Sess. L. 3 (N.C. 2016) 
(discussing North Carolina’s legislature enacting the discriminatory bill). 
13 See Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2607 (2015) (“The Court, in this decision, holds 
same-sex couples may exercise the fundamental right to marry in all States.”).  See also S.B. 
100, 119th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ind. 2016) (observing the failed Senate Bill). 
14 See IND. CODE § 34-13-9-0.7 (exploring RFRA’s fix, which added language preventing 
businesses and organizations from discriminating based on sexual orientation). 
15 See IND. CODE § 22-9-1-2 (listing the groups protected by the Indiana Civil Rights Act, 
of which “sexual orientation” and “gender identity” are not included). 
16 See infra Part IV.B. 
17 See infra Part IV (proposing an amendment to Indiana’s Civil Rights Act, Ind. Code § 22-
9-1-2, which would prevent discrimination against these groups in all the areas listed in the 
Act). 
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LGBT citizens in Indiana.18  Part III then analyzes the need for increased 
protections based on current discrimination and a review of the various 
levels of court scrutiny.19  Part IV proposes an amendment to Indiana’s 
Civil Rights Act, Ind. Code § 22-9-1-2, adding “sexual orientation” and 
“gender identity” to the list of protected groups.20  Finally, Part V 
concludes by summarizing the pertinent information set forth in this Note 
and recommends the Indiana legislature vote to amend its Civil Rights 
Act.21 
II.  BACKGROUND 
Throughout the country, the LGBT community has been in the public 
eye, especially in recent years, due to a push for total and complete 
equality under the law.22  As a result, rights have been addressed from 
legal viewpoints, with opponents and proponents of equal rights and 
protections for the LGBT community vocalizing their opinions.23  Because 
these rights are so heavily and openly discussed today, it is important to 
look at where the law currently stands in Indiana regarding the LGBT 
community.24 
                                                
18 See infra Part II (providing information necessary to understand the issue of LGBT 
discrimination in Indiana and the protections that currently exist). 
19 See infra Part III (analyzing the current law in the state regarding the LGBT community, 
the counterarguments of proponents of religious liberties and freedom, and the benefits of 
adding protections). 
20 See infra Part IV. 
21 See infra Part V. 
22 See, e.g., Guerra, supra note 3 (portraying the state and national outcry in response to 
Governor Pence signing RFRA into effect).  See also Berggoetz, supra note 5 (describing 
Governor Pence’s refusal to allow same-sex marriage to be legalized in 2014 and 
emphasizing his memo, which stated that he was devoted to maintaining traditional 
marriage in Indiana). 
23 See, e.g., Hively v. Ivy Tech Cmty. Coll. Ind., 853 F.3d 339, 359 (7th Cir. 2017) (exploring 
the Seventh Circuit case prohibiting employment discrimination based solely on sexual 
orientation).  The court decided discrimination based on sexual orientation was forbidden 
because it fell under “sex” as a protected group.  Id.  See also INDIANAPOLIS, MARION COUNTY, 
INDIANA CODE OF ORDINANCES § 581-101 (2016) [hereinafter ORD. § 581] (identifying 
counties, such as Marion County, which provide protections for the LGBT community 
greater than those the state of Indiana provides); Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2585 
(2015) (legalizing gay marriage throughout the country by analyzing marriage as a 
fundamental right); Mariga v. Flint, 822 N.E.2d 620, 626 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005) (analyzing the 
Indiana Court of Appeals case allowing a homosexual adoptive parent visitation rights to a 
child born to same-sex parents). 
24 See, e.g., ORD. § 581, supra note 23 (expressing that some Indiana counties and cities, 
such as Marion County, provide increased protections for their LGBT citizens).  This code 
section added “sexual orientation” and “gender identity” to its list of protected groups, 
therefore preventing discrimination against these groups in various areas under the law.  Id.  
See also Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2607.  See also Mariga, 822 N.E.2d at 626 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005) 
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First, Part II.A introduces both Indiana’s current Civil Rights Act and 
Colorado’s Anti-Discrimination Laws.25  Second, Part II.B describes the 
current “patchwork” of protections that prevent discrimination against 
the LGBT community in Indiana.26  Part II.C then discusses the various 
oppositions to providing protections, generally under the guise of 
“religious liberties” or “religious freedom.”27  Finally, Part II.D addresses 
the varying levels of scrutiny a court uses in its equal protection analysis.28 
A. Indiana’s Civil Rights Act 
The Indiana Civil Rights Act currently protects against discrimination 
“based solely on race, religion, color, sex, disability, national origin, or 
ancestry,” as articulated in § 22-9-1-2 of the Indiana Code.29  The Act states: 
(a) It is the public policy of the state to provide all of its 
citizens equal opportunity for education, employment, 
access to public conveniences and accommodations, and 
acquisition through purchase or rental of real property, 
including but not limited to housing, and to eliminate 
segregation or separation based solely on race, religion, 
color, sex, disability, national origin, or ancestry, since 
such segregation is an impediment to equal opportunity.  
Equal education and employment opportunities and 
equal access to and use of public accommodations and 
equal opportunity for acquisition of real property are 
hereby declared to be civil rights. 
 
(b) The practice of denying these rights to properly 
qualified persons by reason of the race, religion, color, 
sex, disability, national origin, or ancestry, of such person 
is contrary to the principles of freedom and equality of 
opportunity and is a burden to the objectives of the public 
policy of this state and shall be considered as 
discriminatory practices.  The promotion of equal 
opportunity without regard to race, religion, color, sex, 
                                                
(recognizing a surprising Indiana Court of Appeals case allowing a homosexual mother to 
have visitation rights to her adopted child, despite objections by the biological mother). 
25 See infra Part II.A. 
26 See infra Part II.B (describing the various protections that are provided to LGBT citizens 
of Indiana at the federal, state, and local level). 
27 See infra Part II.C. 
28 See infra Part II.D. 
29 See IND. CODE § 22-9-1-2 (listing the groups protected by the Indiana Civil Rights Act, 
of which “sexual orientation” and “gender identity” are not included). 
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disability, national origin, or ancestry, through 
reasonable methods is the purpose of this chapter. 
 
 . . . . 
 
(d) It is hereby declared to be contrary to the public policy 
of the state and an unlawful practice for any person, for 
profit, to induce or attempt to induce any person to sell or 
rent any dwelling by representations regarding the entry 
or prospective entry into the neighborhood of a person or 
persons of a particular race, religion, color, sex, disability, 
national origin, or ancestry.30 
Amongst the various protections provided to the protected groups is the 
right of “access to public conveniences and accommodations.”31  
According to the “definitions” section under Indiana Code § 22-9-1-3, 
“‘[p]ublic accommodation’ means any establishment that caters or offers 
its services or facilities or goods to the general public.”32 
Unlike Indiana, Colorado’s Civil Rights Act added “sexual 
orientation” to the list of protected groups.33  While it does not explicitly 
add “gender identity” to the list of protected groups, Colo. Rev. Stat. § 24-
                                                
30 Id. 
31 See IND. CODE § 22-9-1-3(m) (‘“Public accommodation’ means any establishment that 
caters or offers its services or facilities or goods to the general public.”).  Unlike Colorado’s 
definition, Indiana’s definition of “public accommodation” is very short and concise.  See also 
Justin Muehlmeyer, Toward a New Age of Consumer Access Rights:  Creating Space in the Public 
Accommodation for the LGBT Community, 19 CARDOZO J.L. & GENDER 781, 783 (2013) (“At the 
center of this debate is the definition of the term ‘public accommodation’ under the state civil 
rights acts; it is the definition of this term that determines whether a state can enforce the 
civil rights law against private establishments like the Hope Christian preschool.”). 
32 Compare IND. CODE § 22-9-1-3(m) (defining the term “public accommodations” as used 
throughout the Indiana Civil Rights Act), with COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-34-601(2) (observing 
Colorado’s definition of “place of public accommodation” as used throughout the Colorado 
Civil Rights Act).  Unlike Colorado, Indiana’s definition is very short and precise.  Colorado 
specifically lists areas that are considered public accommodations.  However, both 
definitions make the same point.  If a business or entity offers a product or service to the 
public, they will not be allowed to discriminate against protected groups based solely on 
those characteristics. 
33 See COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-34-601 (establishing the Colorado Civil Rights Act, which 
prevents discrimination because of disability, race, creed, color, sex, sexual orientation, 
marital status, national origin, or ancestry in a place of public accommodation).  See also 
Lucien J. Dhooge, Public Accommodation Statutes and Sexual Orientation:  Should There Be a 
Religious Exemption for Secular Businesses?, 21 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 319, 344 (2015) 
(describing that despite protections provided for LGBT citizens in states like Colorado, many 
of these protections still exclude those areas that are closely tied to religion).  “For example, 
Colorado's statute specifically excludes churches, synagogues, mosques and other places 
principally used for religious purposes.”  Id. at 344–45. 
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34-301(7) defines “sexual orientation,” which includes “transgender status 
or another individual's perception thereof.”34  This makes it unlawful to 
deny someone, based solely on sexual orientation or gender identity, “the 
full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, 
advantages, or accommodations of a place of public accommodation.”35 
B. The “Patchwork” of Protections 
Without protections under Indiana’s Civil Rights Act, the LGBT 
community in Indiana is provided only a patchwork of protections from 
discrimination.36  These protections come in the form of amendments, 
court cases, and executive orders.37  Section II.B.1 defines the various 
protections and how they achieve the goal of preventing discrimination 
based on sexual orientation and gender identity.38  Section II.B.2 discusses 
the various state law protections that prevent discrimination.39  Finally, 
Section II.B.3 acknowledges several county and city protections in Indiana 
shielding the LGBT community from discrimination.40 
                                                
34 See COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-34-301(7) (“‘Sexual orientation’ means an individual's 
orientation toward heterosexuality, homosexuality, bisexuality, or transgender status or 
another individual's perception thereof.”). 
35 COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-34-601(2).  Subsection 1 states: 
As used in this part 6, “place of public accommodation” means any 
place of business engaged in any sales to the public and any place 
offering services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations 
to the public, including but not limited to any business offering 
wholesale or retail sales to the public; any place to eat, drink, sleep, or 
rest, or any combination thereof . . . . 
COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-34-601(1). 
36 See, e.g., Hively v. Ivy Tech Cmty. Coll. Ind., 853 F.3d 339, 345, 350 (7th Cir. 2017) 
(reporting the federal case prohibiting employment discrimination based on sexual 
orientation).  See also ORD. § 581, supra note 23 (reviewing county and city ordinances, 
including counties like Marion County, which provide more protections for the LGBT 
community than the state does); Mariga v. Flint, 822 N.E.2d 620, 626 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005) 
(analyzing the Indiana Court of Appeals case that allowed an adoptive mother visitation 
rights to the child against the will of the biological mother). 
37 See, e.g., CITY OF CARMEL, INDIANA CODE OF ORDINANCES § 6-8(a) City 
Nondiscrimination Policy (2016) [hereinafter ORD. § 6-8] (“[N]o person, corporation, 
partnership, company, or other individual or entity located within, or conducting business 
within, the City’s corporate limits shall discriminate . . . on the basis of the latter’s race, color, 
religion, national origin, gender, disability, sexual orientation, gender identity or expression, 
family or marital status, ancestry, age, and/or veteran status.”).  See also Obergefell v. 
Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2607 (2015) (considering the landmark Supreme Court case that 
legalized gay marriage throughout the country by stating that marriage is a fundamental 
right available to same-sex couples). 
38 See infra Section II.B.1. 
39 See infra Section II.B.2. 
40 See infra Section II.B.3. 
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1. Federal Protections 
The federal courts have provided numerous protections and assisted 
the LGBT community throughout the country in achieving equality in 
recent years.41  In Windsor, the Supreme Court, with Justice Kennedy 
writing for the majority, declared the Defense of Marriage Act 
unconstitutional.42  The Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA) was a bill 
passed in Congress that declared marriage as only between a man and a 
woman.43  Edith Windsor, who was considered legally married to her wife 
in New York and other states, was unable to receive an estate tax waiver 
available to married couples under federal law after her wife passed 
away.44  This was because the federal government refused to recognize her 
marriage in accordance with DOMA.45  In his opinion, Justice Kennedy 
reasoned that “DOMA seeks to injure the very class New York seeks to 
                                                
41 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000(e) (clarifying that the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission 
decided that discrimination based on sexual orientation and gender identity is prohibited 
because they are protected under the category of “sex”).  See also Hively, 853 F.3d at 350 
(interpreting the Seventh Circuit decision that concluded similarly to the Equal Employment 
Opportunity Commission).  The court decided that discrimination based on sexual 
orientation was forbidden because it fell under “sex” as a protected group.  Id. at 351–52.  See 
also Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2596. 
42 See United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2681 (2013).  See also Russell K. Robinson, 
Unequal Protection, 68 STAN. L. REV. 151, 199–200 (2016) (conveying the cases of Windsor and 
Obergefell, particularly focusing on Justice Kennedy’s jurisprudence in these cases).  
Robinson gets into a very interesting discussion about differences in Justice Kennedy’s 
voting record in cases involving equal protection claims.  Id. at 198.  In Robinson’s research 
regarding Justice Kennedy’s voting record, “we found a clear divergence between race and 
sex cases, on the one hand, and sexual orientation cases on the other.”  Id. at 199.  The research 
found that in nonunanimous cases, Justice Kennedy cast liberal votes 33% of the time when 
it came to race, 15% of the time when it came to gender, and 75% of the time when it came to 
sexual orientation case.  Id. at 199–200. 
43 See Defense of Marriage Act, 1996 Enacted H.R. 3396, 104 Enacted H.R. 3396, 110 Stat. 
2419 (declaring marriage as only between one man and one woman).  See also Jeffrey L. 
Rensberger, Same-Sex Marriage and the Defense of Marriage Act:  A Deviant View of an Experiment 
in Full Faith and Credit, 32 CREIGHTON L. REV. 409,  410–11 (1998) (“The critics contend that to 
the extent the Defense of Marriage Act attempts to lower that floor, to allow states to give 
less faith and credit to sister-state law and judgments than the first sentence of the clause 
requires, it is an improper attempt to amend the constitution by legislation.”). 
44 See Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2696 (concluding that DOMA is unconstitutional).  See also Dale 
Carpenter, Windsor Products:  Equal Protection from Animus, 2013 SUP. CT. REV. 183, 204 (2013) 
(explaining that Windsor may actually be less about equal protection, and more about a 
newer concept being referred to as the animus test).  Instead of seeing Windsor as a 
substantive liberty or conventional equal protection decision, it should be seen primarily as 
an animus case.  Id. at 203. 
45 See Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2683 (“Windsor paid $363,053 in estate taxes and sought a 
refund.  The Internal Revenue Service denied the refund, concluding that, under DOMA, 
Windsor was not a ‘surviving spouse.’”). 
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protect.  By doing so it violates basic due process and equal protection 
principles applicable to the Federal Government.”46 
In Obergefell, the Supreme Court, with Justice Kennedy again writing 
for the majority, decided marriage is a fundamental right and, as a result, 
legalized same-sex marriage throughout the United States.47  In this case, 
several same-sex couples and a few individuals whose partners were 
deceased brought equal protection claims based on various injuries 
associated with the lack of legal recognition for their marriages.48  The 
court analyzed this case by looking at fundamental rights and considering 
whether or not marriage was considered to be a fundamental right.49  
Justice Kennedy, after looking at whether or not marriage was something 
“based in history and tradition,” determined that marriage was in fact a 
fundamental right.50  Same-sex couples therefore have the legal right to 
                                                
46 Id. at 2693.  Justice Kennedy wrote: 
DOMA's unusual deviation from the usual tradition of recognizing and 
accepting state definitions of marriage here operates to deprive same-
sex couples of the benefits and responsibilities that come with the 
federal recognition of their marriages.  This is strong evidence of a law 
having the purpose and effect of disapproval of that class.  The avowed 
purpose and practical effect of the law here in question are to impose a 
disadvantage, a separate status, and so a stigma upon all who enter into 
same-sex marriages made lawful by the unquestioned authority of the 
States. 
Id. at 2694. 
47 See Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2608 (2015) (“[T]he Court also must hold—
and it now does hold—that there is no lawful basis for a State to refuse to recognize a lawful 
same-sex marriage performed in another State on the ground of its same-sex character.”). 
48 See id. at 2594 (reviewing the landmark case where James Obergefell and several other 
same-sex couples or individuals whose partner had passed away sought access to the state 
and federal protections that come with marriage).  Obergefell’s partner, John Arthur, was 
diagnosed with ALS, and the two men decided to marry before Arthur died from the disease.  
Id.  They traveled to Maryland because same-sex marriage was legal in the state.  Id.  Because 
it was so difficult for Arthur to move, the two were married in the medical transport plane.  
Id.  Arthur passed away two months later; however, Ohio law did not allow Obergefell to be 
listed as Arthur’s surviving spouse, which Obergefell described as “hurtful for the rest of 
time.”  Id. at 2594–95. 
49 See Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2608.  “[T]he right to marry is a fundamental right inherent 
in the liberty of the person, and under the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the 
Fourteenth Amendment couples of the same-sex may not be deprived of that right and that 
liberty.”  Id. at 2604. 
50 See id. at 2602 (highlighting Justice Kennedy’s discussion of history and tradition in his 
analysis of marriage as a fundamental right).  See also Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967) 
(discussing the Virginia case where the Court decided that interracial marriage laws violated 
the petitioners’ due process rights).  In this case, marriage between whites and blacks was 
considered illegal in Virginia and fifteen other states.  Id. at 6–7.  The Court decided: 
Marriage is one of the “basic civil rights of man,” fundamental to our 
very existence and survival.  To deny this fundamental freedom on so 
unsupportable a basis as the racial classifications embodied in these 
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marry, and receive all of the state and federal benefits that come along 
with that right.51 
In Hively, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals declared that 
employment discrimination based on sexual orientation violated the Civil 
Rights Act.52  In this case, Ms. Hively was employed at Ivy Tech College, 
but her employment was terminated.53  Ms. Hively was out openly to the 
public, including her employer, as a lesbian.54  Ms. Hively was successful 
in proving that her employment was terminated with her sexual 
orientation as a consideration.55  The court here stated that this type of 
discrimination violated the Civil Rights Act because sexual orientation fell 
under the umbrella of “sex,” and was therefore a protected class under the 
                                                
statutes, classifications so directly subversive of the principle of equality 
at the heart of the Fourteenth Amendment, is surely to deprive all the 
State's citizens of liberty without due process of law.  The Fourteenth 
Amendment requires that the freedom of choice to marry not be 
restricted by invidious racial discriminations.  Under our Constitution, 
the freedom to marry, or not marry, a person of another race resides 
with the individual and cannot be infringed by the State. 
Id. at 12. 
51 See Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2608 (evaluating the holding of this landmark Supreme Court 
case that legalized gay marriage throughout the country and provided these same-sex 
couples with equal rights under the law). 
52 See Hively v. Ivy Tech Cmty. Coll. Ind., 853 F.3d 339, 352 (7th Cir. 2017) (“We hold only 
that a person who alleges that she experienced employment discrimination on the basis of 
her sexual orientation has put forth a case of sex discrimination for Title VII purposes.”).  The 
court decided discrimination based on sexual orientation was forbidden because it fell under 
“sex” as a protected class.  Id.  Hively was an openly lesbian part-time professor at Ivy Tech 
Community College in Indiana.  Id. at 341.  Hively applied to numerous full-time positions 
but was never allowed to move to these positions.  Id.  After years of trying, Ivy Tech 
eventually refused to renew Hively’s contract for even part-time employment.  Id.  After 
Hively filed suit claiming she was being discriminated against due to her sexual orientation, 
the district court granted Ivy Tech’s motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which 
relief could be granted based on sexual orientation not being a protected class.  Id. at 342. 
53 See Hively, 853 F.3d at 341 (“Believing that Ivy Tech was spurning her because of her 
sexual orientation, she filed a pro se charge with the Equal Employment Opportunity 
Commission on December 13, 2013.”). 
54 See id. (“[W]e conclude today that discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation is a 
form of sex discrimination.”).  See also Stephanie Pisko, (Un?)Lawful Religious Discrimination, 
9 DREXEL L. REV. 101, 128 (2016) (“It is possible that Congress will eventually amend Title VII 
to comport with this trend and explicitly protect LGBT employees under Title VII.”). 
55 See Hively, 853 F.3d at 341 (portraying that Ms. Hively’s sexual orientation was a 
consideration of Ivy Tech Community College in their decision to deny her promotion and 
eventually terminate her). 
Curtin: Let Me Be Queer:  The Need for LGBT Protections in Indiana
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press,
218 VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 53 
Act.56  Indiana itself has provided its own protections in addition to the 
federal protections discussed above.57 
2. Indiana State Protections 
While Indiana courts have made decisions—and the Indiana 
legislature has passed bills—that conflict with the rights of LGBT citizens 
in the state, both have also made moves that provide protections for these 
citizens.58  As will be discussed later, Indiana showed its preference for the 
religious liberties movement when it passed RFRA in 2014.59  As a result 
of this Act, a pizza restaurant was allowed to refuse service to a same-sex 
couple because the restaurant owner claimed his religious liberties 
allowed him to refuse this service.60  Based on public policy considerations 
similar to those listed in Section II.D.1, Governor Pence and the Indiana 
legislature amended RFRA and incorporated language prohibiting this 
                                                
56 See id. at 351–52 (holding that sexual orientation is a protected class in the Seventh 
Circuit because it is included under the category of “sex”). 
57 See, e.g., ORD. § 581, supra note 23 (highlighting Marion County and the City of 
Indianapolis adding “sexual orientation” and “gender identity” to their list of classes 
protected from discrimination).  See also Mariga v. Flint, 822 N.E.2d 620, 633 (Ind. Ct. App. 
2005) (examining this surprisingly progressive Indiana case where the Court of Appeals 
found the Circuit Court had the authority to grant the adoptive mother’s adoption, despite 
being a same-sex couple). 
58 See, e.g., Shalyn L. Caulley, Note, The Next Frontier to LGBT Equality:  Securing Workplace 
Discrimination Protections, 2017 U. ILL. L. REV. 909, 944–45 (2017) (analyzing various forms of 
state legislation and how they can help cure issues of LGBT discrimination in light of RFRAs).  
Caulley explains, “State legislation is by far the best protection currently in place.  The laws 
empower LGBT workers to seek legal recourse if they experience discrimination and provide 
additional penalties to violators, such as jail time or fines.”  Id. at 944. 
59 See IND. CODE § 34-13-9.  Though there was later a “fix,” this was a huge basis for 
discrimination in Indiana.  Id.   
60 See Susanna Kim, Indiana Pizza Restaurant Says It Wouldn't Cater a Gay Wedding, Supports 
Religious Freedom Law, ABC NEWS (Apr. 1, 2015), http://abcnews.go.com/Business/indiana-
pizza-restaurant-cater-gay-wedding-supports-religious/story?id=30045085 
[https://perma.cc/5NAB-69BE] (considering the pizza restaurant who made national news 
after refusing to cater a same-sex couple’s wedding, citing to RFRA as a defense).  The owners 
of Memories Pizza in Walkerton, Indiana, told ABC news that they would serve same-sex 
couples in the restaurant, however they refused to cater a same-sex wedding because 
catering the wedding would violate their religious beliefs.  Id. 
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type of discrimination based on sexual orientation.61  This was considered 
a “fix” to the Act.62 
The Indiana Court of Appeals was surprisingly progressive regarding 
LGBT visitation rights for adoptive parents of the same sex.63  In the early 
2000s, prior to the landmark case of Obergefell, one woman in a same-sex 
relationship adopted the other woman’s biological children.64  The 
relationship failed, and as a result the biological mother moved to another 
state with the children.65  After seeking visitation rights with the adopted 
children, the court granted the adoptive mother visitation rights.66 
3. Local City and County Protections 
In addition to the federal and state protections discussed above, many 
Indiana cities and counties have taken various measures to prevent 
discrimination based on sexual orientation.67  One such county that 
                                                
61 See IND. CODE § 34-13-9.  See also Rachel Johnson Hammersmith, Comment, Equality 
Trumps Religion:  Why Indiana’s Religious Freedom Restoration Act Is Inherently Promoting 
Discrimination Based on Sexual Orientation, 48 U. TOL. L. REV. 109 (2016) (outlining the backlash 
states had as rights for LGBT citizens increased in order to protect the religious rights of their 
citizens).  “Due to the language of Indiana's RFRA and the fact Indiana had no statewide ban 
prohibiting discrimination based on sexual orientation, many were concerned businesses 
could once again be permitted to discriminate based on individual characteristics.”  Id. at 
110–11. 
62 See IND. CODE § 34-13-9-0.7 (observing the “fix” that Indiana added to the Religious 
Freedom Restoration Act, which added minimal protections against discrimination). 
63 See, e.g., Mariga v. Flint, 822 N.E.2d 620, 623 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005) (explaining the case 
allowing visitation rights to a child born to same-sex parents). 
64 See id. (explaining the case allowing visitation rights to a child born to same-sex 
parents). In this case, Lori and her children’s biological father divorced, at which point Lori 
and Julie began a romantic relationship.  Id. at 624.  The children's biological father agreed to 
terminate his parental rights to permit Julie to adopt the children without terminating Lori's 
parental rights.  Id.  Lori left and married a second husband, and the Indiana Court of 
Appeals stated that Julie was still entitled to parental rights.  Id.  The court stated: 
This case requires us to examine the nature of parenthood.  Whether a 
parent is a man or a woman, homosexual or heterosexual, or adoptive 
or biological, in assuming that role, a person also assumes certain 
responsibilities, obligations, and duties.  That person may not simply 
choose to shed the parental mantle because it becomes inconvenient, 
seems ill-advised in retrospect, or becomes burdensome because of a 
deterioration in the relationship with the children's other parent. 
Id. at 622–23. 
65 See Mariga, 822 N.E.2d at 624 (“Lori moved to Georgia with her husband and children 
because her husband was promoted by his employer and transferred to Georgia.”). 
66 See id. at 633 (“As to Julie's petition to vacate the adoption of her children, we find that 
the Circuit Court had authority to grant her petition for adoption in 1997, and it was not 
procured by fraud.”). 
67 See supra Section II.A.1 (explaining the various protections provided to the LGBT 
community throughout the United States by the federal courts); supra Section II.A.2 
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provides these increased protections in Indiana is Marion County.68  A 
second example is the City of Carmel, which passed an ordinance 
protecting the LGBT community from discrimination by creating a system 
that imposes warnings and fines against businesses discriminating based 
on sexual orientation.69 
These protections vary in strength from city to city and from county 
to county.70  Some cities and counties have enacted ordinances that 
prevent discrimination only based on sexual orientation.71  Others have 
enacted ordinances that prevent discrimination based on both sexual 
orientation and gender identity.72  Some cities even have executive orders 
in place to prevent discrimination based on both sexual orientation and 
                                                
(conveying the various protections provided to the LGBT community throughout the state 
of Indiana). 
68 See ORD. § 581, supra note 23 (2016) (illustrating ordinances in Marion County and the 
City of Indianapolis, which added “sexual orientation” and “gender identity” to the list of 
groups protected from discrimination). 
69 See ORD. § 6-8, supra note 37 (underlining the city’s addition of “sexual identification” 
and “gender identity or expression” to the classes protected from discrimination).  See also 
Chris Sikich, Carmel narrowly passes LGBT protections, INDIANAPOLIS STAR (Oct. 5, 2015), 
https://www.indystar.com/story/news/2015/10/06/carmel-city-council-passes-anti-
discrimination-ordinance/73400716/ [https://perma.cc/HX49-EK52] (explaining the 
system of warnings and fines that will result if a business or entity discriminates against any 
of the protected groups based on the protected characteristics). 
70 See Stephanie Wang, How Local LGBT Anti-discrimination Laws Vary in Indiana, 
INDIANAPOLIS STAR (Sept. 23, 2015), https://www.indystar.com/story/ 
news/politics/2015/09/22/local-lgbt-anti-discrimination-laws-vary-indiana/72651754/ 
[https://perma.cc/HJ99-FE6K] (conveying the effects of various local city and county 
protections for the LGBT communities in Indiana).  According to the article, a total of fifteen 
Indiana communities had antidiscrimination ordinances that included sexual orientation 
and gender identity.  Id.  In addition, the mayors of Martinsville and Goshen have pursued 
executive orders.  Id.   
71 See CITY OF HAMMOND, INDIANA CODE OF ORDINANCES § 37.053 Discrimination in 
Public Accommodations (2016) (“It shall be unlawful for any person or establishment which 
caters or offers its services or facilities or goods to the general public to discriminate against 
anyone.”).  Unlike those of Marion County and the City of Carmel, Hammond’s ordinance 
simply limits discrimination to anyone rather than specifically listing “sexual orientation” 
and “gender identity.”  Id.   
72 See, e.g., The Herald Bulletin, Anderson Joins Indiana Cities Protecting LGBT Rights, 
INDIANAPOLIS STAR (Dec. 24, 2015), https://www.indystar.com/story/ 
news/politics/2015/12/24/anderson-joins-indiana-cities-protecting-lgbt-rights/77892944/ 
[https://perma.cc/4ES2-SB7R] (discussing Andersonville’s ordinance banning 
discrimination based on sexual orientation or gender identity).  “The ordinance extends local 
protections on housing, education, employment and public accommodations.”  Id.  See also 
ORD. § 581 (identifying ordinances in Marion County and the City of Indianapolis, which 
prevent discrimination based solely on sexual orientation or gender identity). 
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gender identity.73  These variations represent the current patchwork of 
insufficient LGBT protections in Indiana. 
C. The LGBT Community, Religious Liberties, and a History of Discrimination 
The proponents of religious liberties are the largest opposition to 
providing protections to the LGBT community in both Indiana and 
throughout the United States.74  Part II.C discusses three legal actions that 
have either eliminated or attempted to eliminate protections based on 
sexual orientation or gender identity with religious liberties as a 
justification.75  First, Section II.C.1 addresses Indiana’s RFRA.76  Section 
II.C.2 then discusses Mullins v. Masterpiece Cakeshop, Inc.77  Finally, Section 
II.C.3 describes Indiana Family Institute v. City of Carmel, Indiana, an 
ongoing case in Indiana that is attempting to eliminate city and county 
protections for the LGBT community.78 
1. Indiana’s Religious Freedom Restoration Act 
As referenced in this Note’s introduction, in 2015, Governor Mike 
Pence of Indiana signed the state’s RFRA into effect.79  This bill allowed 
                                                
73 See Wang, supra note 70 (examining how the mayors of both Martinsville and Goshen 
have issued executive orders that prevent discrimination based solely on sexual orientation 
and gender identity). 
74 See, e.g., Mullins v. Masterpiece Cakeshop, Inc., 370 P.3d 272 (Colo. Ct. App. 2015), cert. 
granted sub nom. Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. Civ. Rights Comm'n, 137 S. Ct. 2290 
(June 26, 2017) (analyzing the case in which a baker discriminated against a same-sex couple 
by refusing to bake them a cake).  See also Verified Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive 
Relief, Ind. Family Institute v. Carmel, Indiana, No. 29D01-1512-MI-10207 (Ind. Hamilton 
Cty. Super. Ct. Dec. 10, 2015) [hereinafter Verified Compl., Ind. Family Inst.] (describing the 
complaint filed by several religious groups in Indiana that challenges the “fix” to RFRA 
banning discrimination and local ordinances preventing discrimination based on sexual 
orientation or gender identity). 
75 See, e.g., IND. CODE § 34-13-9 (scrutinizing Indiana’s infamous RFRA, which was signed 
into law by Governor Pence and allows religious groups to discriminate by claiming their 
religious liberties are being violated).  See also IND. CODE § 4-13-9-0.7 (examining the “fix” 
that Indiana added to RFRA that prevents discrimination based solely on sexual orientation); 
Verified Compl., Ind. Family Inst., supra note 74 (interpreting the Indiana case in which 
religious freedom groups are trying to eliminate city and county protections for the LGBT 
community). 
76 See infra Section II.B.1 (discussing Indiana’s RFRA, which allowed private businesses to 
discriminate based on sexual orientation). 
77 See infra Section II.B.2 (describing the Mullins case). 
78 See infra Section II.B.3 (conveying details about the case of Indiana Family Institute v. City 
of Carmel, Indiana, which was allowed to proceed in Indiana courts). 
79 See IND. CODE § 34-13-9 (authorizing Indiana’s infamous RFRA).  See also IND. CODE 
§ 34-13-9-0.7.  However, LGBT individuals were not happy with the solution.  The fix hardly 
corrected the issue of potential discrimination against the LGBT community based on 
religious liberties justifications. 
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individuals and companies to assert that their exercise of religion has 
been, or is likely to be, substantially burdened as a defense in legal 
proceedings.  LGBT citizens feared that this would allow private 
businesses to discriminate against them with no repercussions or 
protections.80  The LGBT community’s fears were confirmed when 
Memories Pizza in Indiana came out publicly and stated it would not cater 
a same-sex wedding.81  The owner refused to cater the wedding, stating 
that he believed marriage was meant to be between a man and a woman.82  
He asserted that this conviction was based on his religious beliefs and that 
he held these beliefs dearly.83  As a result, he refused to cater a gay 
wedding and stated that doing so would be a substantial burden on his 
religious beliefs.84   
When corporations heard of the RFRA, they saw it as government 
approval to discriminate against LGBT individuals.85  As a result, the 
corporations reacted negatively.86  After the RFRA was signed, many large 
corporations and organizations in Indiana threatened to leave if this 
                                                
80 See IND. CODE § 34-13-9 (discussing Indiana’s RFRA allowing a person to assert 
religious beliefs as a defense after violating a discrimination law).  The statute states: 
A person whose exercise of religion has been substantially burdened, or 
is likely to be substantially burdened, by a violation of this chapter may 
assert the violation or impending violation as a claim or defense in a 
judicial or administrative proceeding, regardless of whether the state or 
any other governmental entity is a party to the proceeding. 
IND. CODE § 34-13-9.  See also Guerra, supra note 3 (interpreting Indiana’s RFRA 
and the ways it allows people and businesses to legally discriminate). 
81 See Cavan Sieczkowski, That Anti-Gay Indiana Pizzeria That Received $840,000?  This 
‘Pizza’ Supports the LGBT Community, HUFFINGTON POST (Apr. 6, 2015), 
https://www.huffingtonpost.com/2015/04/06/equality-house-virtual-pizza_n_70101 
90.html [https://perma.cc/CA8M-NAZ8] (describing the Indiana pizza restaurant that 
stated it would refuse to cater a gay wedding and would use Indiana’s RFRA for protection). 
82 See Tom Coyne, Pizza Shop That Backed Indiana Religious Freedom Law Reopens, TIME 
(2015), http://time.com/3816667/indiana-religious-freedom-law-pizza-shop/ [https:// 
perma.cc/HMU9-D322] (outlining the backlash Memories Pizza experienced when they 
refused to cater a same-sex wedding); Sieczkowski, supra note 81 (describing the owner of 
the pizza restaurant’s ability to raise $840,000 when the owners faced backlash for refusing 
to serve the same-sex couple). 
83 See Sieczkowski, supra note 81 (“The law, which many have condemned for promoting 
discrimination against LGBT people, allows individuals and businesses to cite religious 
beliefs as a defense when sued by a private party.”). 
84 See Sieczkowski, supra note 81 (reciting Crystal O’Connor’s additional comment that 
“God has blessed us for standing up for what we believe, and not denying him”). 
85 See Tim Evans, Angie's List Canceling Eastside Expansion Over RFRA, INDIANAPOLIS STAR 
(Mar. 28, 2015), https://www.indystar.com/story/money/2015/03/28/angies-list-
canceling-eastside-expansion-rfra/70590738/ [https://perma.cc/PZN6-Y5HN]. 
86 See Eric Rosenbaum, The Business Case Against Indiana’s Religious Faith, CNBC (Mar. 26, 
2015), https://www.cnbc.com/2015/03/26/the-business-case-against-indianas-religious-
act.html [https://perma.cc/VPN8-ZSKM] (asserting reactions of large corporations and 
businesses to Governor Pence signing the RFRA into effect). 
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blatant discrimination was allowed based on religious justifications.87  
Among these corporations and organizations are the NCAA, Angie’s List, 
and Subaru.88  A prime example of economic backlash came from the 
NCAA, which stated that this law may affect future events and job 
opportunities in Indiana.89  Because the NCAA is “deeply committed to 
providing an inclusive environment for all [its] events,” the organization 
stated that it would need to see the implications of the act.90  At that point 
it would make a decision about future events in the state.91  Luckily, the 
“fix” to the RFRA was enacted before any assessment of future events was 
required.92   
                                                
87 See, e.g., Rosenbaum, supra note 86 (discussing the various corporations who threatened 
to leave Indiana as a result of RFRA).  Large corporations who joined in the discussion 
include Yelp, PayPal, and the NCAA.  Id.  There is also a discussion about the amount of 
talent that would likely leave the state as the result of the discriminatory act.  Id. 
88 See Kay Steiger, The Growing Backlash Against Indiana’s New LGBT Discrimination Law, 
THINK PROGRESS (Mar. 27, 2015), https://thinkprogress.org/the-growing-backlash-against-
indianas-new-lgbt-discrimination-law-68727eff4f02/ [https://perma.cc/9U2W-6BEH] 
(observing various corporations and organizations who threatened to leave Indiana as a 
result of the discriminatory act).  See also Matthew Belvedere, NCAA President:  Indiana Law 
Against Our Core Values, CNBC (Mar. 31, 2015), https://www.cnbc.com/2015/03/31/ncaa-
president-indiana-law-against-our-core-values.html [https://perma.cc/R4XE-MUVS] 
(describing the NCAA president’s concern that the RFRA goes against the organization’s 
“core values”).  “It's important to us because we're an employer here in this state.  But most 
importantly . . . it strikes at the core values of inclusion and diversity.”  Id.  See also Evans, 
supra note 85 (conveying Angie’s List’s dedication to tolerance and opposition to RFRA).  
Angie’s List’s co-founder and chief executive officer Bill Oesterle said, “Angie's List is open 
to all and discriminates against none . . . and we are hugely disappointed in what this bill 
represents.”  Id. 
89 See Mark Alesia, NCAA:  'Religious Freedom' Law Creates Concern for Future Events, 
INDIANAPOLIS STAR (Mar. 26, 2015), https://www.indystar.com/story/sports/college/ 
2015/03/26/ncaa-indiana-religious-freedom-law-mike-pence-mark-emmert-final-four-
indianapolis/70490096/ [https://perma.cc/DS45-WBK7] (outlining the reaction of the 
NCAA in regard to Indiana’s Religious Freedom Restoration Act in which the NCAA 
threatened to pull business from the state). 
90 Mark Emmert, Statement on Indiana RFRA Updated Language, NCAA, 
http://www.ncaa.org/about/resources/media-center/news/statement-indiana-rfra-
updated-language [https://perma.cc/9J2T-MKJH].  Mark Emmert, the NCAA president, 
released this statement regarding the updated language: 
We are very pleased the Indiana legislature is taking action to amend 
Senate Bill 101 so that it is clear individuals cannot be discriminated 
against.  NCAA core values call for an environment that is inclusive and 
non-discriminatory for our student-athletes, membership, fans, staff 
and their families.  We look forward to the amended bill being passed 
quickly and signed into law expeditiously by the governor. 
Id. 
91 See Alesia, supra note 89 (highlighting the NCAA’s serious consideration to leave 
Indiana based on RFRA and the discrimination that would come with it). 
92 See IND. CODE § 34-13-9-0.7 (outlining the amendment to RFRA that allegedly fixed the 
issue of discrimination based on sexual orientation).  The amendment states: 
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Based on the negative outcry regarding RFRA, Governor Pence and 
the state government of Indiana amended RFRA and incorporated 
language prohibiting this type of discrimination based on sexual 
orientation.93  This was considered a “fix” to the Act.94  Neither side 
considered this “fix” to be perfect, even though it successfully limited the 
government in discriminating in a private setting.95  This has led to groups 
asserting their religious freedom protections in the form of legal action in 
Indiana.96   
2. Potential Elimination of Local Protections for the LGBT Community 
Groups and individuals in Indiana have attempted to eliminate local 
city and county LGBT protections on two occasions.97  First, this section 
will discuss Indiana Family Institute v. City of Carmel, Indiana, which sought 
to eliminate local protections and the “fix” to the RFRA.98  Second, this 
                                                
This chapter does not:  (1) authorize a provider to refuse to offer or 
provide services, facilities, use of public accommodations, goods, 
employment, or housing to any member or members of the general 
public on the basis of race, color, religion, ancestry, age, national origin, 
disability, sex, sexual orientation, gender identity, or United States 
military service . . . . 
Id. 
93 See IND. CODE § 34-13-9.  Though there was a later a “fix,” this was a huge basis for 
discrimination in Indiana.  Id.    
94 See IND. CODE § 34-13-9-0.7 (adopting the “fix” that Indiana added to RFRA, which 
added minimal protections against discrimination).  See also Hammersmith, supra note 61, at 
127 Freedom(“Based on previous case law and the theory of state action, the Indiana RFRA is 
invalid in that it unconstitutionally involves the state in discrimination against individuals 
based on their sexual orientation.”). 
95 See IND. CODE § 34-13-9-0.7.  See also United States v. Stanley, 109 U.S. 3 (1883) 
(establishing the state action doctrine, which prevents discrimination only by those who are 
“state actors”); Terri R. Day & Danielle Weatherby, LGBT Rights and the Mini RFRA:  A Return 
to Separate But Equal, 65 DEPAUL L. REV. 907, 920 (2016) (“In fact, Arkansas's attempt to pass 
an expansive religious freedom law followed the mini RFRA saga in Indiana, where, after 
public outcry, Governor Mike Pence demanded amendments to the law to appease the 
concern that the law would open the door to sex and gender discrimination.”). 
96 See, e.g., Verified Compl., Ind. Family Inst., supra note 74 (addressing an Indiana case in 
which religious freedom groups are trying to eliminate city and county protections for the 
LGBT community). 
97 See, e.g., IND. CODE § 34-13-9 (describing Indiana’s infamous RFRA).  See also IND. CODE 
§ 34-13-9-0.7; Verified Compl., Ind. Family Inst., supra note 74 (analyzing an Indiana case that 
was allowed to progress in state court that alleged the RFRA “fix” and local protections for 
the LGBT community are unconstitutional). 
98 See infra Section II.B.2 (describing the actions by religious freedom groups and 
individuals that attempt to eliminate or reduce protections for the LGBT community in 
Indiana). 
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section will describe the bill that the Indiana Senate attempted to pass that 
would have eliminated local city and county protections in the state.99   
After the Indiana government created the “fix” to the RFRA, several 
groups, such as the Indiana Family Institute, Indiana Family Action, and 
The American Family Association of Indiana, felt that their religious 
freedom was still being substantially burdened.100  The groups also felt 
that local city and county protections throughout the state were 
substantially burdening their religious freedom.101  As a result, these 
groups filed a complaint alleging constitutional violations.102  What came 
as a surprise to most was that the judge allowed the complaint to 
proceed.103  This means that the case will be heard.104  If these groups 
succeed, the “fix” to the RFRA protecting the LGBT community will be 
void, and the local city and county protections currently in place 
throughout Indiana will be eliminated.105 
In addition to their prayer for relief regarding local protections and 
the “fix” to the RFRA, the groups have filed a brief in a Colorado case that 
was recently heard before the United States Supreme Court.106  This case 
                                                
99 See infra Section II.B.2. 
100 See Indiana Family Institute, Religious Freedom Legal Defense Fund, 
https://secure2.convio.net/ifi/site/Donation2;jsessionid=00000000.app222b?df_id=1520&
1520.donation=landing&NONCE_TOKEN=D0A2EA3A271A763FF88ECAA95595012 
[https://perma.cc/7ECZ-MSNT] (“On December 10, 2015, The Indiana Family Institute, 
Indiana Family Action, and The American Family Association of Indiana filed a lawsuit 
challenging the Constitutionality of last spring’s Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA) 
‘fix’ as well as the Carmel and Indianapolis-Marion County Nondiscrimination 
Ordinances.”).  See also Wang, supra note 70 (describing the groups believing their rights were 
being violated). 
101 See Wang, supra note 70. 
102 See Verified Compl., Ind. Family Inst., supra note 74 (highlighting the allegations of 
various religious groups that the RFRA fix and local protections for the LGBT community 
are unconstitutional because they violate these groups’ religious freedom and liberties). 
103 See Wang, supra note 70. 
104 See id. (describing the groups who felt their religious rights were being violated by the 
RFRA “fix” and the local protections provided to the LGBT community). 
105 See, e.g., IND. CODE § 34-13-9-0.7 (observing the “fix” that Indiana added to RFRA, which 
added minimal protections against discrimination).  See also ORD. § 6-8 (underlining the city’s 
addition of “sexual identification” and “gender identity or expression” to the classes 
protected from discrimination); ORD. § 581 (examining Indianapolis and Marion County’s 
addition of “sexual orientation” and “gender identity” as protected classes). 
106 See Brief for Indiana Family Institute, Inc. et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners, 
Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. Civ. Rights Comm'n, 138 S. Ct. 1719 (No. 16-111), 2017 
WL 3913765 (analyzing the brief filed by these religious groups in Indiana asking the 
Supreme Court to rule broadly enough to dispose of the ongoing Indiana case).  See also 
Maureen Groppe, How the Gay Wedding Cake Case in Colorado May Affect LGBT Rights in 
Indiana, INDIANAPOLIS STAR (Aug. 31, 2017), https://www.indystar.com/story/news/ 
politics/2017/08/31/conservative-foegroups-challenging-rfra-fix-ask-supreme-court-
weigh-through-colorado-gay-wedding-cas/621782001/ [https://perma.cc/2EA6-E4DR] 
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will be discussed further in the next subsection.107  The brief filed in the 
Supreme Court case asked the Court to rule broad enough to decide the 
prayer for relief in Indiana.108 
3. The Colorado Wedding Cake Case 
In Mullins v. Masterpiece Cakeshop, Inc., a same-sex couple in Colorado 
asked a baker to create a cake for their wedding.109  Unlike Indiana, 
Colorado’s Civil Rights Act protects individuals from discrimination 
based on sexual orientation in access to public accommodations.110  Also, 
Colorado does not have a religious freedom act that allows private 
businesses to discriminate if they feel their religious freedom is 
substantially burdened.111  Regardless, the Colorado baker refused, stating 
that creating this cake for a same-sex wedding would substantially burden 
his religious freedom.112  Both the state trial court and the Colorado 
Supreme Court decided that this type of discrimination violated 
Colorado’s Civil Rights Act.113  As a result, one cannot discriminate based 
                                                
(explaining the plaintiffs in Indiana Family Institute v. City of Carmel, Indiana filing a brief with 
the Supreme Court in Mullins v. Masterpiece Cakeshop, Inc. asking the Justices to rule broad 
enough that it would conclude this case as well). 
107 See infra Section II.B.3 (describing the case of Mullins v. Masterpiece Cakeshop, Inc., which 
was recently argued before the United States Supreme Court). 
108 See Brief for the Petitioners, supra note 106 (highlighting the brief filed by various 
religious groups requesting that the Supreme Court rule broadly in this case). 
109 See Mullins v. Masterpiece Cakeshop, Inc., 370 P.3d 272, 276 (Colo. App. 2015) cert. 
granted sub nom. Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. Civ. Rights Comm'n, 137 S. Ct. 2290 
(June 26, 2017) (describing the Colorado Supreme Court case, which sided with the same-sex 
couple).  The same-sex couple, Craig and Mullins, visited Phillip’s bakery in Lakewood, 
Colorado, and requested that he make a wedding cake.  Id. at 277. 
110 See COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-34-601 (establishing that it is unlawful to discriminate based 
on sexual orientation if providing a “public accommodation”). 
111 See, e.g., IND. CODE § 34-13-9-0.7 (exploring the RFRA’s fix, which added language 
preventing businesses and organizations from discriminating based on sexual orientation). 
112 See Mullins, 370 P.3d at 276 (“Phillips declined, telling them that he does not create 
wedding cakes for same-sex weddings because of his religious beliefs, but advising Craig 
and Mullins that he would be happy to make and sell them any other baked goods.”).  See 
also Deborah A. Widiss, Intimate Liberties and Antidiscrimination Law, 97 B.U. L. Rev. 2083, 
2087 (2017) (“[B]usinesses have argued that their refusal to provide wedding-related services 
to same-sex couples is not a form of unlawful discrimination on the basis of sexual 
orientation, but rather simply disapproval of same-sex marriage.”). 
113 See Mullins, 370 P.3d at 277 (observing the decisions of the Colorado state trial court and 
Supreme Court in deciding whether Phillips violated the state’s antidiscrimination law).  
Craig and Mullins later filed charges of discrimination with the Colorado Civil Rights 
Division (Division), alleging discrimination based on sexual orientation.  Id.  The ALJ then 
found for the same-sex couple, and the Commission affirmed the decision.  Id. Masterpiece 
and Phillips then appealed this decision.  Id. 
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solely on sexual orientation, even as a private business with religious 
freedom as a justification.114   
The baker, Masterpiece Cakeshop, requested certiorari, which the 
United States Supreme Court granted.115  Considering the brief filed by 
the Plaintiffs in the Indiana case, Indiana Family Institute v. City of Carmel, 
Indiana, a lot of rights could have been determined by this landmark 
case.116  The Department of Justice under President Trump’s 
administration also released an opinion on the matter.117  In this opinion, 
the Department of Justice sided with the baker, stating that his religious 
freedom should be protected over those of the same-sex couple being 
refused service.118  The Supreme Court may have decided this case 
without even considering the opinion of the Department of Justice, but it 
is currently clear that our nation’s executive branch has decided 
discrimination based on sexual orientation is justified.119   
D. Not So Equal Protections 
The Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution 
provides in part, “No State shall . . . deny to any person within its 
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”120  The Supreme Court has 
relied on this clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, known as the Equal 
                                                
114 See id. at 277 (“We conclude that the act of same-sex marriage is closely correlated to 
Craig's and Mullins' sexual orientation, and therefore, the ALJ did not err when he found 
that Masterpiece's refusal to create a wedding cake for Craig and Mullins was “because of” 
their sexual orientation, in violation of CADA.”). 
115 See Mullins v. Masterpiece Cakeshop, Inc., 370 P.3d 272 (Colo. App. 2015), cert. granted 
sub nom. Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. Civ. Rights Comm'n, 137 S. Ct. 2290 (June 26, 
2017). 
116 See Brief for the Petitioners, supra note 106 (evaluating the request by various religious 
groups in Indiana to rule broadly enough to dispose of their case).  See also Groppe, supra 
note 106 (reviewing the request by Plaintiffs in the Indiana case to rule broadly). 
117 See Ryan J. Reilly, Trump DOJ To Supreme Court:  Making Gay Wedding Cake Would Violate 
Baker’s Rights, HUFFINGTON POST (Sept. 11, 2017), https://www.huffingtonpost.com/ 
entry/trump-justice-department-gay-wedding-cake_us_59b1af6fe4b0dfaafcf69ee6 
[https://perma.cc/K5W9-4ELX] (conveying the content of the brief filed by the Department 
of Justice under Trump siding with the baker in Mullins v. Masterpiece Cakeshop, Inc.). 
118 See id. (“Forcing Phillips to create expression for and participate in a ceremony that 
violates his sincerely held religious beliefs invades his First Amendment rights.”).  See also 
Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners, Masterpiece Cakeshop, 
Ltd. v. Colo. Civ. Rights Comm'n, 138 S. Ct. 1719 (2017) (No. 16-111), 2017 WL 4004530 
(analyzing the brief filed by the Department of Justice that sided with the baker who refused 
service to same-sex couple). 
119 See Mullins v. Masterpiece Cakeshop, Inc., 370 P.3d 272 (Colo. App. 2015), cert. granted 
sub nom. Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. Civ. Rights Comm'n, 137 S. Ct. 2290 (June 26, 
2017).  See also Reilly, supra note 117 (noting that the Department of Justice supports the baker 
who denied service to the same-sex couple on First Amendment grounds). 
120 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. 
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Protection Clause, as a key provision for combating invidious 
discrimination.121  The Fourteenth Amendment, however, has been 
interpreted to apply only to state action and not to private, or non-state, 
actors.122   
When an equal protection claim is brought against a state actor, a 
court will look at a law or policy using one of three types of judicial 
scrutiny:  strict scrutiny, intermediate scrutiny, or rational basis.123  Strict 
scrutiny is reserved for those groups considered to be “suspect 
classifications,” such as race or national origin, and requires a court to look 
at whether the law or policy is narrowly tailored and necessary to achieve 
a compelling government interest.124  Intermediate scrutiny does not rise 
to the level of strict scrutiny, but instead requires that the law or policy be 
substantially related to an important government interest.125  Finally, there 
is rational basis review, which only requires a law or policy be rationally 
related to a legitimate government interest.126  Under rational basis 
                                                
121 See Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (outlining the Supreme Court’s analysis, 
which sparked the modern era of equal protection jurisprudence).  Justice Warren writing 
for the Court stated: 
We conclude that in the field of public education the doctrine of 
“separate but equal” has no place.  Separate educational facilities are 
inherently unequal.  Therefore, we hold that the plaintiffs and others 
similarly situated for whom the actions have been brought are, by 
reason of the segregation complained of, deprived of the equal 
protection of the laws guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment. 
Id. at 495. 
122 See United States v. Stanley, 109 U.S. 3, 11 (1883) (“It is State action of a particular 
character that is prohibited.  Individual invasion of individual rights is not the subject-matter 
of the amendment.”).  See also Hammersmith, supra note 61, at 124 (“The Constitution, 
however, only gives an individual rights against the government and not a private party.  In 
other words, private conduct need not comply with the Constitution.”). 
123 See, e.g., Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996) (setting the standard at “rational basis” 
when determining the constitutionality of legislation that discriminates against persons 
based on sexual orientation); Fisher v. Univ. of Tex., 570 U.S. 297 (2013) (establishing the 
application of strict scrutiny based on race); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976) (applying 
intermediate scrutiny for discrimination based on gender).   
124 See 16B AM. JUR. 2D Constitutional Law § 862 (describing the strict scrutiny test that courts 
apply and the groups covered by this test).  See also Fisher, 570 U.S. at 298–99 (announcing 
the application of strict scrutiny based on racial discrimination). 
125 See 16B AM. JUR. 2D Constitutional Law § 861 (outlining the intermediate scrutiny test 
that courts apply and the groups covered by this test).  See also Craig, 429 U.S. at 197–98 
(establishing the application of intermediate scrutiny based on gender). 
126 See 16B AM. JUR. 2D Constitutional Law § 858 (detailing the rational basis test that courts 
apply and the groups covered by the test).  See also Romer, 517 U.S. at 627–36 (setting the 
standard at “rational basis” when determining the constitutionality of legislation that 
discriminates against persons based on sexual orientation). 
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review, the burden of proof is on the party challenging a law or policy, 
and the government or state actor will usually win.127 
As in Romer v. Evans, when a state actor discriminates based on sexual 
orientation or gender identity, a court will analyze using rational basis 
review.128  In Windsor, the Court analyzed the constitutionality of the 
DOMA after an equal protection claim was brought by a widowed lesbian 
in New York.129  The Court again discussed the standard that the court 
should apply when looking at equal protection based on sexual 
orientation, and it again seemed to apply rational basis, though this now 
appears to be rational basis with a bite.130 
While the Supreme Court has yet to decide otherwise, the Ninth 
Circuit seems to have begun the trend towards heightened scrutiny.131  In 
SmithKline Beecham Corp. v. Abbott Labs., the court finally mentioned 
heightened scrutiny based on sexual orientation.132  While it is true that 
                                                
127 See McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 425–26 (1961) (explaining the deference given 
to state actors and legislators in passing laws, even if those laws create some discrimination, 
when courts use rational basis review).  See also Robert C. Farrell, The Two Versions of Rational-
Basis Review and Same-Sex Relationships, 86 WASH. L. REV. 281, 324 (2011) (noting the 
challenger's burden is to “negative every conceivable basis which might support [the 
statute], whether or not the basis has a foundation in the record”). 
128 See Romer, 517 U.S. 627–36 (observing the court’s analysis in whether or not to invalidate 
the discriminatory law, which involved looking at whether the law was rationally related to 
a legitimate government interest). 
129 See United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2693 (2013) (“In granting certiorari on the 
question of the constitutionality of § 3 of DOMA, the Court requested argument on two 
additional questions:  whether the United States’ agreement with Windsor’s legal position 
precludes further review and whether BLAG has standing to appeal the case.”).  In this case, 
Justice Kennedy, speaking for the majority, states: 
The Constitution’s guarantee of equality “must at the very least mean 
that a bare congressional desire to harm a politically unpopular group 
cannot” justify disparate treatment of that group.  In determining 
whether a law is motived by an improper animus or purpose, 
“‘[d]iscriminations of an unusual character’” especially require careful 
consideration.  DOMA cannot survive under these principles. 
Id. at 2693 (citations omitted). 
130 See Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2693 (“The avowed purpose and practical effect of the law here 
in question are to impose a disadvantage, a separate status, and so a stigma upon all who 
enter into same-sex marriages made lawful by the unquestioned authority of the States.”). 
131 See SmithKline Beecham Corp. v. Abbott Labs., 740 F.3d 471, 481 (9th Cir. 2014) (“In its 
words and its deed, Windsor established a level of scrutiny for classifications based on sexual 
orientation that is unquestionably higher than rational basis review.”). 
132 See id. (holding that discrimination based on sexual orientation during jury selection 
violated equal protection because the court should apply a heightened standard).  The Ninth 
Circuit in this case looks to the Supreme Court’s reasoning in Windsor to determine the level 
of scrutiny to be applied.  Id.  The court came to the conclusion that “Windsor's ‘careful 
consideration’ of DOMA's actual purpose and its failure to consider other unsupported bases 
is antithetical to the very concept of rational basis review.”  Id. at 482.  The court decided that 
a heightened level of scrutiny is required based on the reasoning from Windsor.  Id. at 484. 
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the Court in Windsor hinted at it, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in 
SmithKline expressly stated that “[they were] required by Windsor to apply 
heightened scrutiny to classifications based on sexual orientation for 
purposes of equal protection.”133  Regardless, when a Plaintiff brings an 
equal protection claim based on sexual orientation discrimination, the 
Supreme Court will analyze using rational basis review.134   
III.  ANALYSIS 
Indiana, as well as its citizens, would benefit from comprehensive, 
state-wide protections for the LGBT community.135  As described in Part 
II.B of this Note, the LGBT citizens of Indiana are currently only protected 
by a patchwork of protections.136  In order to protect the LGBT community 
from further discrimination, Indiana should amend its Civil Rights Act 
and add the terms “sexual orientation” and “gender identity” to the list of 
protected groups.137  Without these protections, LGBT citizens are left only 
with the option of an equal protection claim if the discrimination is by a 
state actor and no legal options if the discrimination is by a private 
party.138   
First, Part III.A emphasizes the important issues the LGBT community 
faces in Indiana and the need for increased protections.139  Second, Part 
III.B describes the possible equal protection claims the LGBT community 
could bring when a state actor discriminates against members of the LGBT 
community.140  Third, Part III.C analyzes Colorado’s solution to private 
party discrimination, such as amending its Civil Rights Act to provide 
                                                
133 Compare United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013) (noting that courts must give 
careful consideration), with SmithKline Beecham Corp. v. Abbott Labs., 740 F.3d 471, 484 (9th 
Cir. 2014) (creating rational basis with a bite).  
134 See Parker Williams, Scrutiny of the Venire, Scrutiny from the Bench:  Smithkline Beecham 
Corp. v. Abbott Laboratories and the Application of Heightened Scrutiny to Sexual Orientation 
Classifications, 64 CATH. U. L. REV. 803, 803, 817 (2015) (“[In Romer, t]he Supreme Court struck 
down the law under rational basis review, finding that it ‘fail[ed], indeed defie[d], even [the 
rational basis] conventional inquiry.’”). 
135 See infra Part II.D (discussing how providing protections to the LGBT community would 
benefit the state of Indiana as a whole). 
136 See supra Part II.A (conveying the current protections, both federal and state, that LGBT 
citizens have preventing discrimination). 
137 See infra Part IV (proposing a simple solution of amending Indiana’s Civil Rights Act, 
which would provide LGBT citizens with increased protections from discrimination). 
138 See Jackson v. Metro. Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 349 (1974). 
139 See infra Part III.A (describing the various reasons both LGBT citizens and non-LGBT 
citizens in Indiana need comprehensive protections for LGBT citizens). 
140 See infra Part III.B (analyzing the realities of an equal protections claim as an option for 
LGBT citizens in Indiana when they are discriminated against). 
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LGBT citizens a private cause of action.141  Finally, Part III.D discusses the 
realities of amending Indiana’s Civil Rights Act to include protections for 
LGBT citizens.142 
A. The Need for Comprehensive Protections 
Through legislation, many states provide protections to LGBT citizens 
based on sexual orientation and gender identity.143  These states 
demonstrate that discrimination based on these characteristics, whether 
by the state or by private parties, will no longer be tolerated.144  States such 
as Indiana that have failed to add these types of protections harm not only 
their LGBT citizens by leaving them vulnerable to blatant discrimination 
based on nothing but ideology but also harm the economic well-being of 
the state.145 
In terms of vulnerability to discrimination, currently, Indiana Code 
§ 31-11-1-1 invalidates any marriage between members of the same 
gender in the state, even if these marriages are legally valid in the state 
where they were solemnized.146  While it is true that this statute cannot be 
upheld due to Obergefell,147 protections for LGBT citizens in Indiana are 
                                                
141 See infra Part III.C (detailing the advantages of antidiscrimination legislation for LGBT 
citizens, especially the steps that Colorado took to protect its citizens). 
142 See infra Part III.D (observing that amending Indiana’s Civil Rights Act seems extreme, 
however it is actually not that unlikely based on the state’s history). 
143 See, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE ANN. 49.60.030 (noting “[t]he right to be free from 
discrimination because of race, creed, color, national origin, sex, honorably discharged 
veteran or military status, sexual orientation”); N.Y. EXEC. LAW 296 (“For an employer or 
licensing agency, because of an individual’s age, race, creed, color, national origin, sexual 
orientation . . . .”); WIS. STAT. ANN. 111.36 (defining employment discrimination as 
“[d]iscriminating against any individual in promotion, compensation paid for equal or 
substantially similar work, or in terms, conditions or privileges of employment or licensing 
on the basis of sex . . .”).  See also State Maps of Laws & Policies:  Public Accommodations, HUM. 
RIGHTS CAMPAIGN (Apr. 25, 2015), https://www.hrc.org/state-maps/public-accomodations 
[https://perma.cc/A4PD-FHDG] (portraying a map of various states that provide 
protections for LGBT citizens from discrimination in public accommodations). 
144 See Muehlmeyer, supra note 31, at 782–83 (discussing various state’s protections for 
LGBT citizens from discrimination in public accommodations and the impact these changes 
have had on those states);  David M. Forman, A Room for “Adam and Steve” at Mrs. Murphy's 
Bed and Breakfast:  Avoiding the Sin of Inhospitality in Places of Public Accommodation, 23 COLUM. 
J. GENDER & L. 326, 365 n.174 (2012) (conveying various businesses’ refusals to accommodate 
gay and lesbian couples at bed and breakfast establishments for religious reasons). 
145 See Lauren Box, Note, It’s Not Personal, It’s Just Business:  The Economic Impact of LGBT 
Legislation, 48 IND. L. REV. 995, 997 (2015) (“This Note explores the impact of LGBT legislation 
on a state's economy, arguing that a refusal to pass positive LGBT legislation can have a 
negative economic impact on a state's coffers and its ability to attract economic investment.”). 
146 See IND. CODE § 31-11-1-1 (stating that “a marriage between persons of the same gender 
is void in Indiana even if the marriage is lawful in the place where it is solemnized”). 
147 See Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2607 (2015) (“The Court, in this decision, holds 
same-sex couples may exercise the fundamental right to marry in all States.”). 
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only provided by the patchwork described in Part II.A of this Note.148  
While it is also true that this patchwork provides limited protections in 
the form of court cases and local ordinances, many issues may still arise 
as a result of lacking state-wide protection.149  For example, LGBT citizens 
may be denied access to public accommodations, such as when Memories 
Pizza refused to cater a same-sex couple’s wedding because of religious 
beliefs.150  Many of these issues are the result of the religious liberties 
movement and a difference in moral ideology.151  Discrimination against 
LGBT citizens is a real and ongoing problem in Indiana; therefore, 
providing protections against discrimination is imperative.152   
A lack of tolerance for the LGBT community has also been shown to 
impact state economics.153  Eliminating protections and allowing for 
discrimination negatively impacts a state’s economy.154  The outcries from 
                                                
148 See infra Part II.A (describing current protections, both federal and state, that LGBT 
citizens have preventing discrimination). 
149 See, e.g., Hively v. Ivy Tech Cmty. Coll. Ind., 853 F.3d 339 (7th Cir. 2017) (prohibiting 
employment discrimination based on sexual orientation).  The court decided discrimination 
based on sexual orientation was forbidden because it fell under “sex” as a protected group.  
Id.  See also ORD. § 581-101 (2016) (observing Marion County’s protections for the LGBT 
community that are beyond those provided by the State); Mariga v. Flint, 822 N.E.2d 620 
(Ind. Ct. App. 2005) (allowing visitation rights to a child born to same-sex parents). 
150 See Coyne, supra note 82 (“A northern Indiana pizzeria that closed after its owner said 
his religious beliefs wouldn’t allow him to cater a gay wedding opened Thursday to a full 
house of friends, regulars and people wanting to show their support.”). 
151 See Nancy J. Knauer, Religious Exemptions, Marriage Equality, and the Establishment of 
Religion, 84 UMKC L. REV. 749, 782 (2016) (exploring the impact freedom of religious 
expression has on the rights of LGBT citizens).  In her article, Knauer states the following 
with regard to attitudes about LGBT citizens: 
There is no question that religious beliefs that teach disapproval and 
even animus towards LGBT individuals and their families enjoy 
absolute protection under the Free Exercise Clause.  However, when 
religious beliefs translate into public action they traditionally step over 
the line and become subject to state regulation.  For example, a county 
clerk who refuses to issue a marriage license to a same-sex couple could 
face internal discipline or criminal charges for the failure to discharge 
her official duties or a federal lawsuit for deprivation of civil rights.  
Religious marriage exemption laws would protect the clerk from such 
actions provided the refusal was based on his religious belief that 
marriage is between one man and one woman. 
Id. at 782. 
152 See LGBT Rights in Indiana, EQUALDEX (2018), https://www.equaldex.com/region/ 
united-states/indiana [https://perma.cc/2VH2-WMRY] (outlining the areas in which LGBT 
citizens in Indiana still lack protection, including in employment discrimination, housing 
discrimination, and public accommodations). 
153 See Box, supra note 145, at 1013–20 (conveying the various economic impacts that 
discrimination has on a state).  
154 See, e.g., Alesia, supra note 89 (“NCAA President Mark Emmert expressed concern 
Thursday about Indiana's ‘religious freedom’ law, saying the Indianapolis-based group 
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Indiana-based corporations after Governor Pence signed the Religious 
Freedom Restoration Act into effect demonstrate some of these negative 
implications.155  After this Act was signed, many large corporations and 
organizations in Indiana threatened to leave the state if this blatant 
discrimination was allowed based on religious justifications.156  These 
corporations and organizations include those whose headquarters are 
located in Indiana, such as the NCAA, Angie’s List, and Subaru.157   
Texas also experienced similar corporate outcries after attempting 
passage of its bathroom ban bill.158  According to a Dallas News article, 
“CEOs from 51 Fortune 500 companies have publicly condemned the 
bathroom bill as discriminatory and bad for the Texas economy.  Three of 
those firms are in the top 10, and 20 are headquartered in Texas.”159  These 
examples demonstrate that various corporations actively opposed the 
elimination of LGBT protections.160  This shows that failure to provide 
protections may lead to adverse economic effects on Indiana as a whole.161   
B. Is All Discrimination Equal? 
The Fourteenth Amendment provides LGBT citizens with equal 
protection under the law.162  As a result, LGBT citizens may use the 
                                                
would examine ‘how it might affect future events as well as our workforce.’”).  See also Box, 
supra note 145, at 998 (“Consequently, states lacking inclusive LGBT policies will miss out on 
valuable investment.”).  “For example, executives of large Fortune-500 companies like 
Facebook have expressed hesitancy toward investing in states lacking pro-LGBT legislation.”  
Id. 
155 See, e.g., IND. CODE § 34-13-9 (portraying Indiana’s infamous RFRA, which allowed 
religious groups to assert that their religious beliefs would be substantially burdened by 
something as a defense). 
156 See Rosenbaum, supra note 86 (discussing the various corporations who threatened to 
leave Indiana as a result of RFRA).  Large corporations who joined in the discussion include 
Yelp, PayPal, and the NCAA.  Id.  There is also a discussion about the amount of talent that 
would likely leave the state as a result of the discriminatory act.  Id. 
157 See Steiger, supra note 88 (observing various corporations and organizations such as 
NCAA, Angie’s List, and Subaru, who threatened action based on RFRA passage). 
158 See S.B. 6, 85th Leg., 1st Spec. Sess. (Tex. 2017) (relating to regulations and policies for 
entering or using a bathroom or changing facility; authorizing a civil penalty). 
159 Lauren McGaughy & Ariana Giorgi, Big Business Has (Almost) Killed the Texas Bathroom 
Bill, DALLAS NEWS (Aug. 10, 2017), https://www.dallasnews.com/news/texas-
legislature/2017/08/09/big-business-almost-killedthe-texas-bathroom-bill 
[https://perma.cc/5DY7-JWFU]. 
160 See Steiger, supra note 88 (observing various corporations and organizations who 
threatened to leave Indiana as a result of the discriminatory act). 
161 See Box, supra note 145, at 998 (discussing the various economic impacts that 
discrimination based on sexual orientation and gender identity has on a state). 
162 See U.S CONST. amend. XIV (“No State shall . . . deny to any person within its 
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”).  See also Stephen Michael Sheppard, Bouvier 
Law Dictionary Equal Protection Clause, THE WOLTERS KLUWER BOUVIER LAW DICTIONARY 
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Fourteenth Amendment as a cause of action when they are discriminated 
against based on sexual orientation or gender identity.163  The issue, 
however, is that the Fourteenth Amendment only prevents state actors 
from discriminating.164  Therefore, an LGBT citizen may only sue state 
actors under the Fourteenth Amendment and may not assert an equal 
protection claim against a private party.165  In addition, equal protection 
claims based on sexual orientation or gender identity against state actors 
are very difficult to win, especially in light of religious freedom 
protections.166  Section III.B.1 acknowledges the inadequacies of an equal 
protection claim when an LGBT citizen is discriminated against.167  Section 
III.B.2 addresses the difficult burden an LGBT citizen bringing an equal 
protection claim would have to meet.168   
1. The Realities of an Equal Protection Claim 
Even when it is a state actor discriminating, an equal protection claim 
is nearly impossible to win due to the rational basis review a court would 
apply.169  Of the three types of scrutiny discussed in Part II.C, laws 
affecting LGBT citizens in Indiana would likely not be entitled to strict or 
                                                
(2012) (“The guarantee of equal protection of the laws requires the assessment of all 
categories created by laws that assign a burden or a benefit to one group but not to another.”). 
163 See John Nicodemo, Comment, Homosexuals, Equal Protection, and the Guarantee of 
Fundamental Rights in the New Decade:  An Optimist's Quasi-Suspect View of Recent Events and 
Their Impact on Heightened Scrutiny for Sexual Orientation-Based Discrimination, 28 TOURO L. 
REV. 285, 289 (2012) (“Fourteenth Amendment scholars and enthusiasts have witnessed a 
series of events in the years 2010 and 2011 that somehow indicate a potential for a change in 
the status of the LGBT community in Equal Protection issues.”). 
164 See Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163, 172 (1972) (“Our cases make clear that 
the impetus for the forbidden discrimination need not originate with the State if it is state 
action that enforces privately originated discrimination.”). 
165 See id. at 173 (“Our holdings indicate that where the impetus for the discrimination is 
private, the State must have ‘significantly involved itself with invidious discriminations’ in 
order for the discriminatory action to fall within the ambit of the constitutional 
prohibition.”). 
166 See Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 320 (1993) (“The burden is to ‘negative every conceivable 
basis which might support it, whether or not the basis has a foundation in the record.’”). 
167 See infra Section III.B.1 (outlining the realities of an equal protection claim for an LGBT 
citizen who has been discriminated against). 
168 See infra Section III.B.2 (analyzing the difficult burden that an LGBT citizen will have to 
meet, especially in light of the heightened level of scrutiny based on religious liberties). 
169 See Farrell, supra note 127, at 324 (describing the heavy burden that must be met by a 
plaintiff under rational basis review).  See also Rational Basis Scrutiny Law and Legal Definition, 
USLEGAL.COM (2016), https://definitions.uslegal.com/r/rational-basis-scrutiny/ 
[https://perma.cc/XGL3-QARL] (“Under rational basis scrutiny, the means need only be 
‘rationally related’ to a conceivable and legitimate state end.”). 
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intermediate scrutiny.170  In fact, it appears that a court would actually 
look at these laws under a rational basis review.171  In Romer v. Evans, the 
Supreme Court set the standard at “rational basis” when determining the 
constitutionality of legislation that discriminates against persons based on 
sexual orientation.172  However, the Supreme Court as of late seemed to 
almost waiver in its conviction to applying a rational basis standard.173 
There is of course an argument that the Court actually applies a higher 
standard based on sexual orientation.174  There is also an argument that 
courts should apply an even higher level of scrutiny based on sexual 
orientation being an immutable trait.175  This, however, is a topic for 
another scholarly work that the author will likely pursue in the future.176  
Regardless, as of now, a court will likely only use some variation of 
rational basis review when an equal protection claim is brought against a 
state actor who is discriminating based on sexual orientation or gender 
                                                
170 See Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 635 (1996) (conveying the standard at “rational basis” 
when determining the constitutionality of legislation that discriminates against persons 
based on sexual orientation).  See also SmithKline Beecham Corp. v. Abbott Labs., 740 F.3d 
471, 489 (9th Cir. 2014) (finding that discrimination based on sexual orientation during jury 
selection violated equal protection, however the court here appears to use a more stringent 
test than simply rational basis). 
171 See Schroeder v. Hamilton Sch. Dist., 282 F.3d 946, 950–51 (7th Cir. 2002) (holding that 
the Seventh Circuit applies rational basis review in cases of discrimination based on sexual 
orientation).  “Homosexuals do not enjoy any heightened protection under the 
Constitution.”  Id. at 951.   
172 See Romer, 116 S. Ct. at 1629.  See also Katie R. Eyer, Protected Class Rational Basis Review, 
95 N.C. L. REV. 975, 992–93 (“Thus, while discussions of ‘animus’ and a special ‘rational basis 
with bite’ standard have dominated scholarly descriptions of the LGBT rights cases' 
connection with rational basis review, in fact the cases themselves—and the lower courts' 
application of them—have, as in the 1970s, applied a variety of diverse, often diffuse and 
poorly defined approaches to robust rational basis scrutiny.”). 
173 Compare United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013) (finding the DOMA to be 
unconstitutional), with SmithKline Beecham Corp., 740 F.3d at 471 (ruling that discrimination 
based on sexual orientation during jury selection violated equal protection). 
174 See Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2693 (highlighting the holding of this monumental case that 
declared the DOMA unconstitutional and arguably applied a heightened standard).  The 
court does not seem to conclude exactly what level of scrutiny should be applied.  Id.  See also 
SmithKline Beecham Corp., 740 F.3d at 481.  The Ninth Circuit in this case looks to the Supreme 
Court’s reasoning in Windsor to determine the level of scrutiny to be applied.  Id.  The court 
came to the conclusion that “Windsor's ‘careful consideration’ of DOMA's actual purpose and 
its failure to consider other unsupported bases is antithetical to the very concept of rational 
basis review.”  Id. at 482.  The court decided that a heightened level of scrutiny was required 
based on the reasoning in Windsor.  Id. at 484.   
175 See, e.g., Samuel A. Marcosson, Constructive Immutability, 3 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 646 (2001) 
(discussing the new concepts of which traits are considered immutable by the courts and 
traits that are not).  Marcosson makes a strong argument that sexual orientation is 
constructively immutable, meaning that the characteristic of sexual orientation should be 
treated as immutable by the law.  Id. at 691. 
176 The author reserves this topic for further discussion and analysis. 
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identity.177  This leaves a plaintiff bringing an equal protection claim with 
a very heavy burden, and the plaintiff is therefore likely to lose on this 
claim.178   
2. An Equal Protection Claim Is Insufficient 
While the Supreme Court seems to have opted for the rational basis 
test in regard to sexual orientation, the Court has opted for a heightened 
level of scrutiny when looking at religious liberties.179  In Employment 
Division v. Smith, Justice Scalia delivered the majority opinion for the 
Supreme Court, analyzing how religious liberties apply to certain laws.180  
Most significant, however, is Justice O’Connor’s discussion in her 
concurrence about the level of scrutiny to apply when looking at First 
Amendment protection.181  These rights will be encroached upon only if 
they are narrowly tailored to serve a compelling governmental interest.182  
The Supreme Court again used strict scrutiny in Burwell v. Hobby Lobby.183  
In this case, the Supreme Court held that the Affordable Care Act’s 
contraceptive mandate violated equal protection because it substantially 
burdened Hobby Lobby’s religious exercise.184   
                                                
177 See Kenji Yoshino, The New Equal Protection, 124 HARV. L. REV. 747, 759–60 (2011) 
(describing the tendency of the canon to focus on specific theories of “rational basis with 
bite” and “animus” as the exclusive explanations for meaningful rational basis review, 
including the LGBT rights cases). 
178 See New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297, 303 (1976) (“[O]ur decisions presume the 
constitutionality of the statutory discriminations and require only that the classification 
challenged be rationally related to a legitimate state interest.”).   
179 See Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 573 U.S. 682 (2014) (discussing the heightened 
level of scrutiny courts apply when looking at religious expression). 
180 See Emp't Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990). 
181 See id. at 894 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (“Under our established First Amendment 
jurisprudence, we have recognized that the freedom to act, unlike the freedom to believe, 
cannot be absolute.”).  See also Michael D. Currie, Scrutiny Mutiny:  Why the Iowa Supreme 
Court Should Reject Employment Division v. Smith and Adopt a Strict Scrutiny Standard for 
Free-Exercise Claims Arising Under the Iowa Constitution, 99 IOWA L. REV. 1363, 1378 (“Every 
state supreme court that has rejected Smith's rational-basis test in favor of adopting a 
heightened or strict scrutiny standard of review has compared the text of its state 
constitution's free-exercise provision to the Free Exercise Clause.”). 
182 See Emp't Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990) (O’Connor, J., concurring) (describing the 
level of scrutiny applied by the court regarding freedom of speech as strict scrutiny).  Justice 
O’Connor noted, “The compelling interest test effectuates the First Amendment's command 
that religious liberty is an independent liberty, that it occupies a preferred position, and that 
the Court will not permit encroachments upon this liberty, whether direct or indirect, unless 
required by clear and compelling governmental interests ‘of the highest order.’”  Id. at 895. 
183 See Hobby Lobby, 573 U.S. at 688–92 (discussing the heightened level of scrutiny courts 
apply when looking at religious expression). 
184 See id.  As discussed by Justice Alito in the majority opinion: 
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Due to varying levels of scrutiny, if it came down to a conflict between 
protections of religious liberties and protections based on sexual 
orientation or gender identity, religious liberties would likely win.185  This 
would mean continued discrimination against the LGBT community 
based on “religious liberties,” and also the possibility of increased 
discrimination.186  This is a legitimate concern that citizens of Indiana must 
address in light of both recent legislation and lawsuits that are attempting 
to limit, or even eliminate, protections against blatant discrimination 
based on sexual orientation or gender identity.187 
As a result, a Fourteenth Amendment equal protection claim is 
therefore insufficient to protect LGBT citizens in Indiana against 
discrimination.188  First, equal protection claims, even if successful, only 
protect LGBT citizens in Indiana from discrimination by state actors.189  
Second, even when these claims can be brought by LGBT citizens, they are 
                                                
The “exercise of religion” involves “not only belief and profession but 
the performance of (or abstention from) physical acts” that are “engaged 
in for religious reasons.”  Business practices that are compelled or 
limited by the tenets of a religious doctrine fall comfortably within that 
definition.  Thus, a law that “operates so as to make the practice 
of . . . religious beliefs more expensive” in the context of business 
activities imposes a burden on the exercise of religion. 
Id. at 2770. 
185 Compare Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996) (setting the standard at “rational basis” 
when determining the constitutionality of legislation that discriminates against persons 
based on sexual orientation), with Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 573 U.S. 682, 688–92 
(2014) (discussing the heightened level of scrutiny applied by courts when analyzing 
religious expression). 
186 See, e.g., Jennifer Gerarda Brown, Peacemaking in the Culture War Between Gay Rights and 
Religious Liberty, 95 IOWA L. REV. 747, 780 (2010) (conveying the proposed form of mediation 
that in order to help proponents of LGBT rights and proponents of religious liberties 
reconcile their differences).  “A significant subset of objectors to LGBT rights feels an 
emerging threat to religious liberty; they fear that a law or policy ensuring LGBT equality 
will require them to do something inconsistent with their religious beliefs or prevent them 
from doing something that their religious beliefs require.”  Id. at 750. 
187 See, e.g., Verified Compl., Ind. Family Inst., supra note 74 (introducing a current lawsuit 
in Indiana, in which members of religious liberties groups are attempting to eliminate city 
and county protections for LGBT citizens); S.B. 100, 119th Gen. Assemb., 2d Reg. Sess. (Ind. 
2016) (describing the attempt by Indiana legislators to pass a bill that would eliminate all 
increased city and county protections for LGBT citizens). 
188 See Farrell, supra note 127, at 318. 
189 See Kevin Cole, Federal And State “State Action”:  The Undercritical Embrace of a 
Hypercriticized Doctrine, 24 GA. L. REV. 327, 329 (1990) (describing the state action doctrine as 
applied in both state and federal courts and as applied under both the U.S. Constitution and 
state constitutions).  See also United States v. Stanley, 109 U.S. 3, 11 (1883) (holding that the 
constitution applies only to “state actors,” and not to individuals). 
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nearly impossible to win because a court will only analyze using rational 
basis review.190   
C. But Private Actors Can Still Discriminate? 
Even if by chance an LGBT citizen were able to win an equal 
protection claim against a state actor based on discrimination, an LGBT 
citizen could not bring such a claim against private parties who 
discriminate.191  Because the Fourteenth Amendment does not apply to 
private parties, individual states must provide protections in the form of 
Civil Rights Acts in order to protect citizens, such as LGBT citizens, from 
private party discrimination.192   
One such state that provides protections from discrimination for its 
LGBT citizens is Colorado.193  Colorado’s Civil Rights Act gives LGBT 
citizens a cause of action when they are discriminated against.194  These 
protections allow LGBT citizens to sue if denied access to a public 
convenience or accommodation based on their sexual orientation or 
gender identity.195  More importantly, these protections would allow for a 
cause of action against anyone who discriminates, whether it is a state 
actor or a private citizen.196  The protections therefore provide the LGBT 
citizen who has been discriminated against a cause of action against a 
                                                
190 See also Rational Basis Scrutiny Law and Legal Definition, USLEGAL.COM (2016), 
https://definitions.uslegal.com/r/rational-basis-scrutiny/ [https://perma.cc/XGL3-
QARL]. 
191 See Jackson v. Metro. Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 349–50 (1974) (“While the principle that 
private action is immune from the restrictions of the Fourteenth Amendment is well 
established and easily stated, the question whether particular conduct is ‘private,’ on the one 
hand, or ‘state action,’ on the other, frequently admits of no easy answer.”). 
192 See Muehlmeyer, supra note 31, at 786 (“Absent a contravening statute, the common law 
general rule is that the owner or the agent of a public accommodation may refuse admission 
or service to anyone for any reason.”). 
193 See COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-34-601 (“It is a discriminatory practice and unlawful for a 
person, directly or indirectly, to refuse . . . because of disability, race, creed, color, sex, sexual 
orientation, marital status, national origin, or ancestry, the full and equal enjoyment of the 
goods . . . or accommodations of a place of public accommodation.”). 
194 See Mullins v. Masterpiece Cakeshop, Inc., 370 P.3d 272, 280 (Colo. App. 2015) (“[T]o 
prevail on a discrimination claim under CADA, plaintiffs must prove that, ‘but for’ their 
membership in an enumerated class, they would not have been denied the full privileges of 
a place of public accommodation.”). 
195 See id. at 279 (“We conclude that the act of same-sex marriage is closely correlated to 
Craig's and Mullins' sexual orientation, and therefore, the ALJ did not err when he found 
that Masterpiece's refusal to create a wedding cake for Craig and Mullins was ‘because of’ 
their sexual orientation, in violation of CADA.”). 
196 See id. at 280 (“[A] ‘place of public accommodation’ is ‘any place of business engaged in 
any sales to the public and any place offering services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or 
accommodations to the public, including but not limited to any business offering wholesale 
or retail sales to the public.’”). 
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private party, such as a pizza restaurant, but also allows the citizen to 
avoid bringing a burdensome equal protection claim.197 
Unlike Colorado, the Indiana Civil Rights Act does not include 
“sexual orientation” or “gender identity” as protected groups, and 
therefore does not provide “access to public conveniences and 
accommodations” based on these characteristics.198  As a result, in Indiana, 
a same-sex couple denied services from a “public accommodation” would 
have no source of relief under the Indiana Civil Rights Act.199  This means 
that had it not been for the backlash from businesses to the RFRA that 
eventually resulted in a “fix,” an Indiana pizza restaurant could have 
continued discriminating without any repercussions under the Indiana 
Civil Rights Act.200   
One example of Colorado’s success is the case of Masterpiece v. Mullins, 
which allowed the plaintiffs to bring their discrimination claim using 
Colorado’s antidiscrimination law as a legal platform.201   In Indiana, the 
plaintiffs would have been unable to bring an equal protection claim 
because Masterpiece Cakeshop would likely not be considered a “state 
actor.”202  Even if they were able to somehow argue Masterpiece Cakeshop 
was a “state actor,” the plaintiffs would still be required to meet the heavy 
burden associated with rational basis review, which is the level of scrutiny 
a court would apply based on sexual orientation discrimination.203  The 
                                                
197 See id. at 283 (“CADA prohibits places of public accommodations from basing their 
refusal to serve customers on their sexual orientation, and Masterpiece violated Colorado's 
public accommodations law by refusing to create a wedding cake for Craig's and Mullins' 
same-sex wedding celebration.”). 
198 See IND. CODE § 22-9-1-3(m) (defining “public accommodations”). 
199 Compare IND. CODE § 22-9-1-2 (analyzing Indiana’s Civil Rights Act, which does not 
provide protections based on sexual orientation and gender identity), with COLO. REV. STAT. 
§ 24-34-601 (portraying Colorado’s antidiscrimination law which prevents discrimination in 
public accommodations based on sexual orientation or gender identity).  See, e.g., Mullins v. 
Masterpiece Cakeshop, Inc., 370 P.3d 272, 283 (Colo. App. 2015), cert. granted sub nom. 
Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. Civ. Rights Comm'n, 137 S. Ct. 2290 (June 26, 2017) 
(“CADA prohibits places of public accommodations from basing their refusal to serve 
customers on their sexual orientation, and Masterpiece violated Colorado's public 
accommodations law by refusing to create a wedding cake for Craig's and Mullins' same-sex 
wedding celebration.”). 
200 See Kim, supra note 60 (portraying a pizza restaurant in Walkerton, Indiana, that refused 
to cater a same-sex wedding, citing to RFRA as a protection). 
201 See Mullins v. Masterpiece Cakeshop, Inc., 370 P.3d 272, 283 (Colo. App. 2015). 
202 See, e.g., Jackson v. Metro. Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 354 (1974) (“Doctors, optometrists, 
lawyers, Metropolitan, and Nebbia's upstate New York grocery selling a quart of milk are all 
in regulated businesses, providing arguably essential goods and services, ‘affected with a 
public interest.’  We do not believe that such a status converts their every action, absent more, 
into that of the State.”)  Id. 
203 See, e.g., Yoshino, supra note 177, at 759–60 (describing the tendency of the canon to 
focus on specific theories of “rational basis with bite” and “animus” as the exclusive 
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plaintiffs were able to avoid these considerations because Colorado 
provided them a cause of action when discriminated against based on 
sexual orientation.204  Therefore, amending the Indiana Civil Rights Act 
would give LGBT citizens in Indiana a cause of action against private 
actors when they are discriminated against and would also allow these 
citizens to avoid bringing a burdensome equal protection claim.205 
D. Amending Indiana Code Section 31-11-1-1 Is Not So Far-Fetched After All 
While there are legitimate concerns regarding the possibilities of 
blatant discrimination, this section addresses concerns that amending the 
Indiana Civil Rights Act to provide protections for the LGBT community 
is unrealistic.206  It is inevitable that opposition to amending the Indiana 
Civil Rights Act will include religious liberties movement arguments, but 
opponents may also argue this solution is too far-fetched for a 
conservative state like Indiana.207 
While it is true that Colorado is considered more progressive than 
Indiana in regard to LGBT rights, amending the Civil Rights Act in 
Indiana is still realistic.208  First, Indiana demonstrated its favor towards 
the religious liberties movement when it passed RFRA in 2014.209  As a 
result of this Act, Memories Pizza restaurant in Walkerton, Indiana, was 
allowed to refuse catering services to a same-sex couple because the 
restaurant owner claimed his religious liberties allowed him to refuse this 
                                                
explanations for meaningful rational basis review, including the LGBT rights cases).  See, e.g., 
New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297, 303 (1976) (deferring to the state when applying rational 
basis review). 
204 See Mullins, 370 P.3d at 293 (“Without CADA, businesses could discriminate against 
potential patrons based on their sexual orientation.  Such discrimination in places of public 
accommodation has measurable adverse economic effects.”)  Id. 
205 See, e.g., Muehlmeyer, supra note 31, at 786 (describing that without some form of statute 
or legislation making discrimination unlawful, the common law generally allows private 
parties to discriminate freely in providing goods or services). 
206 See, e.g., Box, supra note 145, at 998 (discussing the various economic impacts that 
discrimination has on a state). 
207 See Lisa Bornstein & Megan Bench, 2015 Special Issue Advancing LGBTQIA Rights in a 
Post-Obergefell World:  Married on Sunday, Fired on Monday:  Approaches to Federal LGBT Civil 
Rights Protections, 22 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 31, 51 (“While civil rights protections for 
sexual orientation and gender identity discrimination are increasingly recognized, these 
protections remain incomplete.”). 
208 See, e.g., IND. CODE § 34-13-9-0.7 (observing the “fix” that Indiana added to RFRA, which 
added minimal protections against discrimination).  This is one area at issue in the lawsuit 
mentioned above.  Id.  See also Mariga v. Flint, 822 N.E.2d 620 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005) (explaining 
the case allowing visitation rights to a child born to same-sex parents). 
209 See IND. CODE § 34-13-9. 
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service.210  Based on public policy considerations similar to those listed in 
Section II.D.1 of this Note, Governor Pence amended RFRA and 
incorporated language prohibiting this type of discrimination based on 
sexual orientation,211 which was considered a “fix” to the Act.212 
Second, Indiana was surprisingly progressive regarding LGBT rights 
prior to most regarding visitation rights for adoptive parents of the same 
sex.213  In the early 2000s, prior to the landmark case of Obergefell, one 
woman in a same-sex relationship adopted the other woman’s biological 
child because the women were unable to legally marry in Indiana at the 
time.214  The relationship ended up failing, resulting in the biological 
mother moving to another state with the child.215  After being denied 
visitation rights to the adopted child, the Indiana Court of Appeals ended 
up granting the adoptive mother visitation rights.216   
As a result, both the executive and judicial branches of government in 
Indiana acknowledge that the LGBT citizens in Indiana need protection 
from discrimination perpetrated by both state actors and private parties.217  
Therefore, legislators should amend the Indiana Civil Rights Act to 
provide LGBT citizens with protections from discrimination by both state 
and private actors. 
IV.  CONTRIBUTION 
This Note proposes that Indiana amend the Civil Rights Act and add 
“sexual orientation” and “gender identity” to the list of protected 
                                                
210 See Kim, supra note 60 (portraying the news story where a pizza restaurant refused to 
cater a same-sex couple’s wedding, citing to RFRA for protection). 
211 See IND. CODE § 34-13-9 (describing Indiana’s infamous RFRA, and although there was 
a later a “fix,” this was a huge basis for discrimination in Indiana). 
212 See IND. CODE § 34-13-9-0.7. 
213 See Mariga, 822 N.E.2d at 624 (“Julie and Lori decided that Julie should adopt the 
children for a variety of reasons, among them Julie's desire to provide financially for the 
children via life insurance, college assistance, and health insurance, and a hope to solidify 
their family unit.”). 
214 See id. (“The Tippecanoe County Circuit Court granted her petition for adoption on July 
10, 1997, and the children's last names were officially changed to ‘Mariga-Morris.’”).  
215 See id. (“In November 1998, Lori and Julie separated, and since that time both children 
have remained with Lori.”). 
216 See id. at 633 (“As to Julie's petition to vacate the adoption of her children, we find that 
the Circuit Court had authority to grant her petition for adoption in 1997, and it was not 
procured by fraud.”). 
217 See, e.g., IND. CODE § 34-13-9-0.7 (“This chapter does not . . . authorize a provider to 
refuse to offer or provide services . . . to any member or members of the general public on 
the basis of . . . sexual orientation, gender identity . . . .”); Mariga v. Flint, 822 N.E.2d 620, 624 
(Ind. Ct. App. 2005) (“In light of the purpose and spirit of Indiana's adoption laws . . . the 
legislature could not have intended such a destructive and absurd result.”). 
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groups.218  First, Part IV.A amends the current Civil Rights Act to reflect 
protections based on sexual orientation and gender identity.219  Next, Part 
IV.B explains that amending the language of the current Civil Rights Act 
is the best solution to remedy LGBT discrimination in Indiana because it 
is realistic and adds the necessary protections.220 
A. The Indiana Civil Rights Act 
The Civil Rights Act currently protects citizens against discrimination 
“based solely on race, religion, color, sex, disability, national origin, or 
ancestry . . . .”221  This Note proposes that Indiana amend the Civil Rights 
Act to include “sexual orientation” and “gender identity” to the list of 
protected groups.222  This would provide the LGBT community with all 
the protections that other groups are currently provided.223  The language 
would be as follows: 
(a) It is the public policy of the state to provide all of its 
citizens equal opportunity for education, employment, 
access to public conveniences and accommodations, and 
acquisition through purchase or rental of real property, 
including but not limited to housing, and to eliminate 
segregation or separation based solely on race, religion, 
color, sex, disability, national origin, ancestry, sexual 
orientation, or gender identity since such segregation is an 
impediment to equal opportunity.  Equal education and 
employment opportunities and equal access to and use of 
public accommodations and equal opportunity for 
acquisition of real property are hereby declared to be civil 
rights. 
 
                                                
218 See IND. CODE § 22-9-1-2 (listing the groups protected by the Indiana Civil Rights Act). 
219 See infra Part IV.B (conveying the changes that would be made to the current Indiana 
Civil Rights Act in order to provide protections for the LGBT community). 
220 See infra Part IV.B (describing why the addition of “sexual orientation” and “gender 
identity” to the Indiana Civil Rights Act is the best solution). 
221 IND. CODE § 22-9-1-2. 
222 See IND. CODE § 22-9-1-2 (highlighting the lack of protections for citizens based on 
“sexual orientation” and “gender identity”).  The proposed amendments are italicized and 
are the contribution of the author. 
223 See IND. CODE § 22-9-1-3 (conveying the definition of “public accommodations”).  
Protections are provided to protected groups, including “access to public conveniences and 
accommodations.”  Id.  See also IND. CODE § 22-9-1-2 (demonstrating that Indiana’s Civil 
Rights Act currently only protects groups based on race, religion, color, sex, disability, 
national orientation, or ancestry). 
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(b) The practice of denying these rights to properly 
qualified persons by reason of the race, religion, color, 
sex, disability, national origin, ancestry, sexual orientation, 
or gender identity of such person is contrary to the 
principles of freedom and equality of opportunity and is 
a burden to the objectives of the public policy of this state 
and shall be considered as discriminatory practices.  The 
promotion of equal opportunity without regard to race, 
religion, color, sex, disability, national origin, ancestry, 
sexual orientation, or gender identity through reasonable 
methods is the purpose of this chapter. 
 
 . . . . 
 
(d) It is hereby declared to be contrary to the public policy 
of the state and an unlawful practice for any person, for 
profit, to induce or attempt to induce any person to sell or 
rent any dwelling by representations regarding the entry 
or prospective entry into the neighborhood of a person or 
persons of a particular race, religion, color, sex, disability, 
national origin, ancestry, sexual orientation, or gender 
identity.224 
B. Commentary 
In order to remedy LGBT discrimination in Indiana, this Note 
recommends an amendment to the Indiana Civil Rights Act including 
“sexual orientation” and “gender identity” to the list of protected 
groups.225  First, this amendment is important because the court applies a 
higher standard for freedom of speech and expression than it does for 
discrimination based on sexual orientation.226  Second, this amendment 
would provide increased protections in light of current efforts to eliminate 
protections against discrimination.227  Finally, an amendment would 
                                                
224 IND. CODE § 22-9-1-2. 
225 See IND. CODE § 22-9-1-2 (urging that “sexual orientation” and “gender identity” be 
added to the list of protected groups).  The proposed amendments are italicized and are the 
contribution of the author. 
226  See supra Section III.C.1 (analyzing the level of scrutiny the court uses when looking at 
discrimination based on sexual orientation, which is likely rational basis). 
227 See supra Section III.C.3 (reviewing the various legal fights and attacks occurring 
between the religious freedom proponents and the LGBT community). 
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provide the LGBT community with the same protections currently given 
to people based on race, religion, sex, etc., no more and no less.228 
First, as discussed in Part III.C, the proponents of religious liberties 
and freedom would likely win the discrimination debate in a court of law.  
Unlike Colorado, the LGBT community currently lacks protections that 
would allow LGBT individuals to fight their way up to the United States 
Supreme Court.229  For this reason, it is important to amend the Indiana 
Civil Rights Act and include “sexual orientation” and “gender identity” 
as protected categories so the LGBT community has at least some platform 
on which to fight.230  The counterargument, of course, comes from the 
religious liberties proponents, who feel their rights are also being 
violated.231  The issue here is a balancing of rights, and the right to “access 
to public conveniences and accommodations” for the LGBT community 
should prevail. 
Second, including “sexual orientation” and “gender identity” to the 
list of protected groups is important based on current legitimate 
discrimination, or attempts to discriminate, because of these 
characteristics.  There are ongoing attempts to eliminate the limited 
protections currently provided to the LGBT community, as discussed in 
Section III.C.3 of this Note.232  Amending the Indiana Civil Rights Act 
would provide these citizens with a platform on which to challenge these 
various forms of discrimination.233  One may argue that the LGBT 
community does not need these protections to the same extent that other 
citizens need these protections due to race, gender, or religion.234  
However, history has shown that discrimination in Indiana based on 
sexual orientation and gender identity is a real and legitimate issue,235 and 
                                                
228 See supra Part II.D (describing some of the protections provided by the Indiana Civil 
Rights Act, specifically “access to public conveniences and accommodations”). 
229 See, e.g., Mullins v. Masterpiece Cakeshop, Inc., 370 P.3d 272, 279 (Colo. App. 2015), cert. 
granted sub nom. Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. Civ. Rights Comm'n, 137 S. Ct. 2290 
(June 26, 2017) (allowing a same-sex couple to file a complaint and win in state court because 
Colorado had protections against discrimination based on sexual orientation). 
230 See IND. CODE § 22-9-1-2. 
231 See, e.g., Verified Compl., Ind. Family Inst., supra note 74 (challenging the “fix” to RFRA 
and various local LGBT protections in Indiana as unconstitutional). 
232 See supra Section III.C.3 (outlining the various attempts in Indiana to limit protections 
for the LGBT community). 
233 See, e.g., Mullins, 370 P.3d at 279 (agreeing that the anti-discrimination protections 
provided by Colorado were a platform upon which citizens can sue). 
234 See, e.g., Lauren R. Deitrich, Note, Transgender and the Judiciary:  An Argument to Extend 
Batson Challenges to Transgender Individuals, 50 VAL. U. L. REV. 719, 755 (2016) (encouraging 
that courts should reassess the standard of review based on the definition of “immutable,” 
even though the courts currently do not recognize “transgender” as an immutable trait). 
235 See, e.g., Box, supra note 145, at 995–98 (providing various instances where LGBT 
discrimination resulted in economic impact).  See also S.B. 100, 119th Gen. Assemb., 2d Reg. 
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 53, No. 1 [], Art. 7
https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol53/iss1/7
2018] LGBT Protections in Indiana 245 
amending the Civil Rights Act would prevent this discrimination from 
continuing. 
Finally, amending Indiana’s Civil Rights Act and including “sexual 
orientation” and “gender identity” would provide LGBT citizens with the 
same protections others receive.236  In particular, this would eliminate the 
possibility of “segregation and separation” based on these 
characteristics.237  Currently, protected groups cannot be denied “access 
to public conveniences and accommodations” based solely on their 
protected characteristic.238  The LGBT community in Indiana is not 
provided this luxury, and it is in the interest of fairness and justice that the 
LGBT community should receive these protections in light of current 
discrimination.239  Amending the Civil Rights Act and including language 
is a better solution than proposing new legislation based on 
counterarguments.  Legislation created specifically to protect the LGBT 
community could result in negative responses by those groups currently 
protected by the Indiana Civil Rights Act.240  By simply amending the Act 
as it stands, the LGBT community would avoid possible opposition by 
these minority groups, who would likely view this new legislation as 
unfair or as providing increased protections to just one group.241 
V.  CONCLUSION 
Indiana needs statewide, comprehensive protections for its LGBT 
citizens.  This can be achieved by simply amending Indiana’s Civil Rights 
Act, Ind. Code § 22-9-1-2, and including the terms “sexual orientation” 
and “gender identity” to the list of protected groups.  This solution is 
similar to that of states like Colorado, who have successfully limited 
discrimination by providing their citizens statewide protections. 
Currently, the LGBT community in Indiana is protected only by a 
patchwork of protections, and therefore, members of the LGBT 
community are susceptible to discrimination.  An equal protection claim 
                                                
Sess. (Ind. 2016) (noting a Senate Bill in Indiana that failed, but would have eliminated local 
protections for the LGBT community).  See also Kim, supra note 60 (reporting an Indiana pizza 
restaurant’s refusal to serve a same-sex wedding, citing RFRA as its justification). 
236 See supra Part II.D (identifying various protections provided to listed groups under the 
Indiana Civil Rights Act). 
237 See IND. CODE § 22-9-1-2(a). 
238 See IND. CODE § 22-9-1-3 (“‘Public accommodation’ means any establishment that caters 
or offers its services or facilities or goods to the general public.”). 
239 See, e.g., Box, supra note 145, at 995–98. 
240 See Robinson, supra note 42, at 172 (observing that while groups based on race and 
national origin are entitled to strict scrutiny under the law, an animus review may actually 
be more beneficial than the so-called strict scrutiny analysis). 
241 See Robinson, supra note 42, at 173. 
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is insufficient to protect these citizens from discrimination; therefore, a 
cause of action provided by Indiana is necessary.  Unfortunately, political 
undertakings by Indiana’s governor and various courts have proven that 
not all discrimination is equal under the law.  As a result, the court applies 
a higher standard for religious freedom protections than it does for 
discrimination based on sexual orientation.  The religious liberties groups 
would therefore win in a case such as Indiana Family Institute v. City of 
Carmel, Indiana.  There is an active effort by the religious liberties and 
freedom groups in Indiana to prevent and eliminate protections for the 
LGBT community. 
Based on the discussion of standards applied by the Court, there is a 
very real potential for LGBT protections against discrimination to be 
limited even further.  Finally, there are policy reasons for protecting LGBT 
citizens in Indiana from discrimination.  One such reason is economic, 
especially based on the backlash from passage of RFRA.  Another is based 
on Colorado’s success in amending its Civil Rights Act to provide 
protections.  Therefore, Indiana should amend its Civil Rights Act and 
include “sexual orientation” and “gender identity” to its list of protected 
groups. 
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